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AN ISSUER'S DUTY UNDER RULE 10b-5 TO
CORRECT AND UPDATE MATERIALLY
MISLEADING STATEMENTS
Robert H. Rosenblum *
To the uninitiated, the general antifraud provisions of the federal securi-
ties laws might appear to be reasonably straightforward in their application.
Loosely translated, after all, those provisions say "tell the truth and don't
leave out anything important."1 The initiated know better. Countless cases,
treatises, and law review articles have examined, re-examined, and disagreed
on when a participant in the securities markets has violated these provisions
by telling a half-truth, by telling an outright lie, or by saying nothing at all.2
This Article focuses on when an issuer of securities can say nothing at all.
It examines the still murky areas of when an issuer has a duty to correct a
statement that it discovers was misleading when made (a "duty to correct"),
and when an issuer has a duty to update a statement that was accurate when
made, but later became misleading (a "duty to update"). Both duties arise
under section 10(b)3 ("section 10(b)") and rule lOb-5 ("rule lOb-5")4 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 5
• Mr. Rosenblum is with the Washington, D.C. office of Fulbright & Jaworski. The
author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of Jean W. Gleason, Esq. during the
preparation of this Article.
Mr. Rosenblum prepared a portion of this Article while legal counsel to then-Commissioner
Joseph A. Grundfest of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Securities and Ex-
change Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication
or statement by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are the author's and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Commission, of the Commission staff, or of Mr. Grundfest.
Except when referring to actual people, all gender specific language applies equally to both
men and women.
1. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990).
2. Cf Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) ("When we
deal with private actions under Rule lOb-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has grown from
little more than a legislative acorn.").
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
5. This Article refers to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj
(1988), as the "Exchange Act." This Article refers to the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (1988), as the "Securities Act."
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The concept that an issuer has a duty to correct its own statements gained
widespread judicial and academic acceptance following the decision of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in Ross
v. A.H. Robins Co.6 Ross involved statements made by the A.H. Robins
Company ("Robins") in two annual reports and a prospectus which indi-
cated that the Dalkon Shield, a contraceptive device it manufactured, was
safe and effective.7 Shareholders of Robins alleged that the company vio-
lated rule lOb-5 by failing to correct these statements after an unpublished
research report concluded that the Dalkon Shield was not as safe or as effec-
tive as the earlier statements indicated.' The court concluded that Robins'
failure to correct its earlier statements was within the purview of rule lOb-5.9
An issuer's duty to update its own statements is in some respects similar
to, but analytically is distinct from, its duty to correct its statements. Re-
quiring an issuer to correct a statement that it discovers was wrong when
made is somewhat different from requiring an issuer to continuously review
the many true statements it makes, and to update those statements if and
when they become inaccurate.l1 The question of when such a duty might
arise was presented as a central issue to the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit in Backman v. Polaroid Corp.11 Backman involved a
statement that allegedly became materially misleading after it was made in
Polaroid's quarterly report.12 A three-judge panel initially ruled that Polar-
oid breached a duty to update the statement. 3 On rehearing en banc, how-
ever, the court essentially side-stepped the duty to update issue by holding
that the statement in the quarterly report never became materially
misleading. 14
6. 465 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).
7. Id. at 907.
8. Id.
9. Id. Nonetheless, the district court concluded that plaintiffs could not maintain an
action under rule 10b-5, holding instead that section 18 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r,
which provides an express private right of action for misleading statements made in documents
filed with the Commission, was the shareholders' exclusive remedy. 465 F. Supp. at 910-13.
The court of appeals reversed the district court on this point, and held that the shareholders'
rule lob-5 claim was not precluded. 607 F.2d at 551-55.
10. Interestingly, the Ross court stated that "lilt is now clear that there is a duty to cor-
rect or revise a prior statement which was accurate when made but which has become mislead-
ing due to subsequent events." 465 F. Supp. at 908. This statement literally recognizes a duty
to update, although the factual situation in Ross involved a duty to correct. Id.
11. [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,899, at 94,937-3 (1st Cir.),
rev'd en banc, 910 F.2d 10, 16-18 (1st Cir. 1990).
12. Id. at 94,938-39.
13. Id. at 94,943-45.
14. Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
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Related to the question of whether an issuer has a duty to correct or up-
date its own statements is the question of whether an issuer has a duty to
correct or update misleading statements made about it by third parties, such
as reporters and financial analysts. The nearly unanimous view of courts
that have considered this question is that issuers ordinarily have no such
duty. 15
Courts that have considered whether an issuer has a duty to correct or
update statements have done so without establishing a generally accepted
framework for their analysis. Several United States Supreme Court deci-
sions, however, particularly in the insider trading context, have created an
analytical framework addressing the more general question of when defend-
ants violate rule 10b-5 by failing to disclose material information. This Arti-
cle applies this framework to the specific question of when defendants violate
rule lOb-5 by failing to disclose material information necessary to correct or
update misleading statements.
This Article concludes that rule lOb-5 imposes a general duty on issuers to
correct their statements upon discovery that the statements were misleading
when made. The Article also concludes that rule lOb-5 imposes on issuers a
duty to update certain statements upon discovery that they became mislead-
ing at some time after they were made. This duty, however, applies only to
statements that are "forward-looking"-statements that by their terms pur-
port to continue to be valid beyond the date they are made. The Article then
discusses certain limitations on when an issuer's failure to correct or update
misleading statements violates rule lOb-5. Next, the Article reviews some
special considerations involving an issuer's duty to update statements it
made in a document it was required to prepare under rules or regulations of
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC or Commission"). Finally,
this Article examines whether an issuer has a duty to correct or update ru-
mors or misleading statements made by third parties. The Article endorses
the nearly unanimous view of the courts that an issuer has no such duty
unless the third party's statements can be attributed to the issuer.
I. THE FRAMEWORK-WHEN IS THERE A DUTY TO DISCLOSE
MATERIAL INFORMATION UNDER RULE 10B-5?
A. Background
Rule lOb-5 prohibits fraudulent conduct in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities. 16 Among the types of fraudulent conduct rule l0b-5
15. See infra notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
16. Rule lOb-5 provides that:
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prohibits are the outright manipulation of securities prices, 7 the making of
statements that are materially misleading,"8 and the omission of certain ma-
terial information.' 9
If a defendant's failure to correct or update a misleading statement vio-
lates rule lOb-5, it does so because it constitutes an "omission" of material
information.2 ° By way of illustration, a plaintiff alleging a breach of a duty
to correct or update a misleading statement alleges, in substance, that the
defendant failed-or omitted-to disclose corrected or updated information,
and that this omission violated rule 10b-5. Stating the same concept in cus-
tomary securities law parlance, a defendant in such a case violated rule lOb-5
only if he had, and breached, an affirmative "duty to disclose" the corrected
or updated information.
To date, the United States Supreme Court has not considered the circum-
stances under which an issuer acquires a duty to disclose corrected or up-
dated information. Other federal courts have considered these duties,2' but
have not provided a generally accepted framework for determining when
such duties arise. However, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts
have established, in other contexts, a framework to determine when a duty
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b(5) (1990).
17. Eg., Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 (1977). "'Manipulation' is
'virtually a term of art when used in connection with securities markets.' The term refers
generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended
to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity." Id. at 476 (quoting Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)).
18. Id. at 474-76.
19. Id. In addition to rule lOb-5, other antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws,
such as Securities Act section 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77()(2) (1988), Securities Act section 17(a),
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1988), and Exchange Act section 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1988), prohibit
misleading statements in specified securities transactions and documents.
20. See, e.g., Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904, 907 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 607 F.2d
545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); see also Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp.
180, 183-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (accounting firm violated rule lOb-5 and the common law tort of
deceit by remaining silent when it discovered financial statements it certified were materially
misleading).
21. See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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to disclose arises under rule lOb-5. This framework provides guidance in
determining when a duty to disclose corrected or updated information arises.
B. When is There a Duty to Disclose?
The most significant Supreme Court cases addressing when a duty to dis-
close material information arises under rule lOb-5 are two insider trading
cases, Chiarella v. United States22 and Dirks v. SEC.23 These cases, among
others, stress that rule lOb-5 does not itself impose a general affirmative duty
to disclose material information.24 Rather, according to the Chiarella and
Dirks Courts, a defendant has an affirmative duty to disclose material infor-
mation only if the defendant has a fiduciary or similar relationship that gives
rise to an affirmative duty to disclose the omitted information, and if the
defendant's failure to disclose that information would be fraudulent.25
At first glance, this framework appears to be circular-it seems to suggest
that an affirmative duty to disclose exists when there is a relationship giving
rise to an affirmative duty to disclose, and that a breach of such a duty is
fraudulent if it is fraudulent. Nonetheless, the framework suggests that
22. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
23. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). It is not surprising that insider trading cases provided the Court
with the opportunity to consider when rule l0b-5 imposes affirmative disclosure duties. A
defendant in an insider trading case violates rule lOb-5 by breaching a duty to disclose mate-
rial, nonpublic information prior to trading while in possession of that information. See, e.g.,
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907
(1961). Thus, the question of when a defendant has such an affirmative disclosure duty is
central to determining insider trading liability.
24. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235; see also Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988) ("Silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under Rule
l0b-.").
25. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653-54; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228-30. The Chiarella Court derived
this holding in large part from the common law principle that an affirmative duty to disclose
material information "arises when one party has information 'that the other [party] is entitled
to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between
them.'" Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a)
(1976)) (alteration supplied by Court). As an interesting aside, comment e to section 551(2)(a)
states that "[ilt is not within the scope of this Restatement to state the rules that determine the
duty of disclosure which under the law of business associations the directors of a company owe
to its shareholders." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) comment e (1976). The
Chiarella Court did not address this disclaimer.
The Chiarella Court also relied heavily on the Commission's decision in Cady, Roberts, in
which the Commission established that the relationship between a corporation's insiders and
the corporation's shareholders, coupled with the unfairness of allowing insiders to trade in the
corporation's stock while in possession of confidential corporate information, requires a corpo-
ration's insiders to abstain from trading in that corporation's shares unless they have first
disclosed all material, nonpublic information of which they are aware. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at
227-28; Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 911-12.
1991]
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three issues must be addressed to determine when a duty to disclose arises:
first, when does a fiduciary relationship exist; second, under what circum-
stances does that relationship give rise to an affirmative disclosure duty; and
third, when is a breach of that duty fraudulent for purposes of rule lOb-5?
C. A Closer Look at the Elements of the Chiarella and Dirks Test
1. When Does a Fiduciary Relationship Exist?
According to the framework established in Chiarella and Dirks, the first
question in determining if a defendant has a duty to disclose for purposes of
rule lOb-5 is whether the defendant has a fiduciary or similar relationship
with the plaintiff.26 Neither Chiarella nor Dirks expressly addresses when
such a relationship arises. In both cases, however, the Court appeared to
agree with the formulation adopted by the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York in United States v. Reed," an insider
trading case. Reed held that, to determine whether a person has a fiduciary
relationship with purchasers or sellers of a corporation's securities, a court
should, among other considerations, look to whether" 'confidence is reposed
on one side and there is resulting superiority and influence on the other.' "28
Language from Chiarella strongly supports this formulation:
[A] duty to disclose arises when one party has information "that
the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or simi-
lar relationship of trust and confidence between them.". . . [In the
insider trading context, which involves an affirmative duty to dis-
26. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653-54; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228-30.
27. 601 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985). In
Reed, the court held that a son who misappropriated information concerning a takeover from
his father, a corporate director, might have had a confidential or fiduciary relationship with his
father sufficient to support lOb-5 liability. Id. at 705.
As this Article went to press, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
an en banc decision, also agreed with the Reed formulation for determining when a fiduciary or
similar relationship arises. United States v. Chestman, No. 89-1276, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
23242, at "51-*53 (2d Cir. Oct. 7, 1991) (en banc). The Chestman court, however, limited the
Reed court's holding that a son and his father had a fiduciary or similar relationship to the
facts of that case. Id. at *54-*55.
28. Reed, 601 F. Supp. at 706 (quoting 36A C.J.S. Fiduciary, at 384 (1961)).
The Supreme Court also appears to have employed the Reed formulation, in substance,
outside the insider trading context. See infra note 57 (discussing Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972)). Other federal courts have employed the Reed formulation
in various non-securities law contexts. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Her-
itage Capital Advisory Services, Ltd., 823 F.2d 171, 173 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 122 (2d Cir. 1982); Francois v. Francois, 599 F.2d 1286, 1292 (3d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1021 (1980); Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 573 F.2d 976,




close material, non-public information about a company prior to
trading in that company's stock, such a duty arises from] a rela-
tionship of trust and confidence between the shareholders of a cor-
poration and those insiders who have obtained confidential
information by reason of their position with that corporation. This
relationship gives rise to a duty to disclose because of the "neces-
sity of preventing a corporate insider from... tak[ing] unfair ad-
vantage of the uninformed minority stockholders.,
29
Moreover, both the Chiarella and Dirks Courts used the considerations
identified in Reed to decide whether the defendants had a fiduciary or similar
relationship with a corporation's shareholders that led to an affirmative duty
to disclose confidential corporate information prior to trading. The
Chiarella Court held that Mr. Chiarella, an employee of a financial printer
who gleaned the identity of takeover targets from documents delivered to the
printer, had no duty to publicly disclose this information prior to trading:
30
No duty could arise from [Mr. Chiarella's] relationship with the
sellers of the target company's securities, for [he] had no prior
dealings with them. He was not their agent, he was not a fiduciary,
he was not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and
confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with
the sellers only through impersonal market transactions.3"
Similarly, in Dirks, the Court held that Mr. Dirks, a financial analyst who
learned, from a former company official, that a company was engaged in a
massive fraud, had no duty to publicly disclose this information prior to
disclosing it to his clients, who then sold stock of the company.32 According
to the Court, Mr. Dirks "was a stranger to [the company], with no pre-
existing fiduciary duty to its shareholders. He took no action, directly or
indirectly, that induced the shareholders or officers of [the company] to re-
pose trust or confidence in him."33
29. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228-29 (quoting Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808,
829 (D. Del. 1951), aff'd, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956)) (footnotes omitted).
30. Id. at 225, 235.
31. Id. at 232-33. Some of the members of the Court would have found Mr. Chiarella
liable on a "misappropriation" theory. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
32. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 648-52 (1983).
33. Id. The Dirks Court also concluded that Mr. Dirks was not a tippee, because the
corporate insiders who provided the confidential information to him "were motivated by a
desire to expose the fraud" and "received no monetary or personal benefit for revealing [the
fraud], nor was their purpose to make a gift of valuable information to [Mr.] Dirks." Id. at
666-67. See also infra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing tippee liability). Thus, the
Court's decision in this regard can be read as concluding that Mr. Dirks had no fiduciary
relationship with the insiders (and therefore had no fiduciary relationship with the corporation
or its shareholders), because the insiders' disclosure to him was not a "confidence" and did not
result in Mr. Dirks obtaining "superiority" or "influence" over those insiders.
1991]
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2. Under What Circumstances Does a Given Fiduciary Relationship
Give Rise to a Particular Affirmative Disclosure Duty?
Determining that a defendant has a fiduciary relationship with a plaintiff
is only the first step in evaluating whether the defendant has an affirmative
disclosure duty. As Justice Frankfurter observed in SEC v. Chenery Corp.:
But to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives
direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What
obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he
failed to discharge these obligations? And what are the conse-
quences of his deviation from duty?"
There does not appear to be a generally accepted test to determine the
scope of a particular fiduciary's affirmative disclosure duties. Instead, the
Supreme Court has looked to a number of factors, such as the language of
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, the legislative history of the Exchange Act and
of section 10(b), common law notions of fraud, and Commission interpreta-
tions of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. a6
The Chiarella Court, for example, considered many of these sources when
it concluded that a duty to disclose material, nonpublic information prior to
trading arises from the fiduciary relationship between corporate insiders and
the corporation's shareholders.37 The Court first observed that neither the
language nor the legislative history of section 10(b) discussed whether insid-
ers had such a duty.3" The Court, however, found that under both common
law and Commission interpretations of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, insiders
Indeed, the Dirks Court implicitly incorporated the considerations identified in Reed in its
tests for determining when "tippees" (see infra note 49 and accompanying text) and "tempo-
rary insiders" (see infra note 50 and accompanying text) have fiduciary relationships giving
rise to a duty to disclose confidential information prior to trading. Both tippees and temporary
insiders (such as underwriters, accountants, and lawyers hired by the corporation) stand in a
position of confidence with a corporate insider or with the corporation, and therefore indi-
rectly with the corporation's shareholders: a tippee receives, albeit improperly, confidential
information from a corporate insider (the "tipper"), and a temporary insider receives confiden-
tial information from the corporation to assist it in achieving corporate purposes. Both tippees
and temporary insiders also must be in a position to influence a corporate insider or the corpo-
ration. A tippee must be able to influence his tipper, because the tipper must "benefit, directly
or indirectly, from his disclosure" to the tippee. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662. A temporary insider
receives the confidential information from a corporation precisely so that he can assist, and
thus presumably influence, the corporation.
34. 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
35. Id. at 85-86.
36. See, e.g.. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-29 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197, 201, 212-14 (1976); cf Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660-63. (relying in
part on a SEC Commissioner's concurring opinion in a Commission administrative decision).
37. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226-30.
38. Id. at 226.
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have a duty to disclose material, nonpublic corporate information prior to
trading.39
The Court has identified other considerations that may be used in appro-
priate instances. For example, a "longstanding acceptance by the courts [of
a reasonable interpretation of section 10(b)], coupled with Congress' failure
to reject [that interpretation] .... argues significantly in favor of [its] accept-
ance. 1 4° In addition, it is appropriate to consider "what may be described as
policy considerations when we come to flesh out the portions of the law with
respect to which neither the congressional enactment nor the administrative
regulations offer conclusive guidance.
41
3. When is the Breach of an Affirmative Disclosure Duty Fraudulent
for Purposes of Rule lOb-5?
Not every breach of a fiduciary duty constitutes a violation of rule lOb-5.
The breach must also involve fraud or deception. 42 This requirement, how-
ever, generally should not be an issue in actions involving a breach of an
affirmative disclosure duty by a fiduciary. Chiarella and Dirks make it clear
that a fiduciary's omission in breach of an affirmative disclosure duty in-
volves fraudulent conduct within the meaning of rule lOb-5.43 The fraud
requirement becomes an issue when, for example, the alleged breach of a
39. Id. at 226-29; see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
40. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 (1975).
41. Id. at 737.
Until recently, the Ninth Circuit also employed a test, referred to as the "flexible duty stan-
dard," that was intended to determine the scope of an affirmative disclosure duty under rule
lOb-5. The flexible duty standard required a court to consider five non-exclusive factors:
the relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff, the defendant's access to the infor-
mation as compared to the plaintiff's access, the benefit that the defendant derives
from the relationship, the defendant's awareness of whether the plaintiff was relying
upon their relationship in making his investment decisions and the defendant's activ-
ity in initiating the securities transactions in question.
White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 1974) (footnotes omitted). The Ninth Cir-
cuit, however, "put to rest the 'flexible duty standard'" in Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp.,
914 F.2d 1564, 1570 (9th Cir. 1990). The Hollinger court stated that the flexible duty standard
is a negligence test, and the Supreme Court, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976), rejected a negligence test in favor of a scienter requirement for rule lOb-5 cases. Hol-
linger, 914 F.2d at 1570.
42. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983); see Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234-35 ("Section
10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud."); Santa Fe
Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1977) (violation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5
must involve more than just a breach of a fiduciary duty, it must also involve deception).
43. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653; Chiarella. 445 U.S. at 228-29; see also Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972) (bank and its officers violated rule lob-5 by breaching
a duty to members of an Indian tribe to disclose that a better price was available for sales of
shares held by the Indians).
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fiduciary duty involves fully disclosed conduct that unfairly benefits majority
shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders."
Also, although not expressly at issue in Chiarella or Dirks, there are other
elements that must be present for any conduct, including a fiduciary's breach
of an affirmative disclosure duty, to violate rule 10-b(5). Some of the more
significant elements include the requirements that the defendant must have
acted with scienter, the undisclosed information must have been material,
the failure to disclose the information must have caused some harm to the
plaintiff, the plaintiff must have relied on the omission, and the fraudulent
conduct must have been in connection with the purchase or sale of a secur-
ity.45 Several of these elements impose significant limitations on when an
issuer's failure to correct or update information violates rule lOb-5.
D. Examples of Affirmative Disclosure Duties
Before applying the test set forth in Chiarella and Dirks to determine
when an issuer has a duty to correct and a duty to update misleading state-
ments, it may be helpful to identify some of the other affirmative disclosure
duties that courts have established, and the fiduciary or similar relationships
giving rise to those duties. Perhaps the best-known example of an affirma-
tive disclosure duty is the duty of corporate insiders to publicly disclose ma-
terial, nonpublic information prior to trading while in possession of that
information. This duty not to engage in "insider trading" arises from the
fiduciary relationship corporate insiders, such as officers and directors4 6 and
44. E.g., Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 474. In Santa Fe, minority shareholders alleged that they
had received an inadequate price from a majority shareholder who employed a "short-form
merger," a Delaware state law procedure that allows shareholders owning 90% or more of an
issuer's outstanding stock to purchase the remaining stock at an announced price. Instead of
exercising their statutorily authorized right to obtain a court appraisal, the minority share-
holders brought an action under rule lOb-5 to set aside the merger. Id. at 465-67. The Court
held that the complaint did not state a cause of action under rule lOb-5 because it did not
involve deception or manipulation. Id. at 474. Rather, the Court characterized the complaint
as alleging only "internal corporate mismanagement." Id. at 479 (quoting Superintendent of
Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971)).
45. See infra notes 113-27 and accompanying text.
46. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654-55; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232; see also Exchange Act
§ 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1988) (including officers and directors, among others, as insiders for
purposes of the prohibition against insiders profiting from purchasing and selling the same
security within a six-month period).
[Vol. 40:289
1991] Materially Misleading Statements
majority or controlling shareholders, 4 have with the non-controlling share-
holders of the corporation.4
"Corporate outsiders" also may have fiduciary relationships with a com-
pany's shareholders that give rise to a duty to disclose confidential corporate
information prior to trading. Among the corporate outsiders who may have
such relationships are people who knowingly have improperly received con-
fidential corporate information (so-called "tippees"), 49 and people who,
while performing work for a corporation, legitimately receive confidential
information (so-called "temporary insiders").
50
47. Superintendent ofIns., 404 U.S. at 12; Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939); List
v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Speed v.
Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951), aff'd, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir.
1956); 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1450 (2d ed. 1961); see also Strong v. Repide, 213
U.S. 419 (1909) (majority shareholder committed common law fraud by purchasing stock from
another shareholder without disclosing material information); Securities Act Section 15, 15
U.S.C. § 77o (1988), and Exchange Act § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1988) (imposing liability
on certain controlling persons); cf Exchange Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1988) (including
10% shareholders, among others, as insiders for purposes of the prohibition against insiders
profiting from purchasing and selling the same security within a six-month period).
48. See supra notes 23, 25; supra note 29 and accompanying text. As the Chiarella Court
put it, the fiduciary relationship that gives rise to the obligation not to trade while in possession
of inside information prior to publicly disclosing it is "a relationship of trust and confidence
between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who have obtained confidential
information by reason of their position with that corporation." Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228
(summarizing the Commission's decision in In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961)).
49. Dirks discussed when tippees are liable for trading while in possession of confidential
information received from a corporate insider.
[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade
on material nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary
duty to the shareholders by disclosing [material, nonpublic] information to the tippee
and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 (footnote omitted). An insider's disclosure of material, nonpublic infor-
mation breaches his fiduciary duty to the shareholders only if "the insider personally will
benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure." Id at 662; accord Chiarella, 445 U.S. at
230 n.12 (" 'Tippees' of corporate insiders have been held liable under § 10(b) because they
have a duty not to profit from the use of inside information that they know is confidential and
know or should know came from a corporate insider.").
50. The Dirks Court specifically identified underwriters, accountants, lawyers, and consul-
tants as examples of people who might acquire such a relationship. The basis for recognizing a
fiduciary relationship on the part of temporary insiders is
that they have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the
business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for corporate
purposes.... For such a duty to be imposed, however, the corporation must expect
the outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential, and the rela-
tionship at least must imply such a duty.
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14 (citations omitted); see, e.g., SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 596, 616-
17 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397, 1403 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
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Corporate outsiders also may have fiduciary relationships with third par-
ties, such as their clients or employers, that serve as the basis for a duty to
disclose confidential corporate information prior to trading. This is the case
when a corporate outsider "misappropriates," or steals, confidential infor-
mation about a company from a third party, if trading while in possession of
that information would breach a duty created by a fiduciary or similar rela-
tionship with the third party.5 For example, investment bankers,52 law-
yers, 53 employees of financial printers,54 and newspaper reporters" who
misappropriate material, nonpublic information about a company from their
clients or employers, in breach of a duty created by a fiduciary relationship
with their clients or employers, violate rule lOb-5 when they trade, or par-
ticipate in schemes to trade, while in possession of that information.56
51. Eg., SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 442-52 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Carpenter,
791 F.2d 1024, 1026, 1031-32 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); SEC v. Materia, 745
F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981);
United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 271-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v. Elliott, 711
F. Supp. 425, 430-31 (N.D. Ill. 1989); United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 699-703, 719-
20 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985); SEC v. Musella, 578 F.
Supp. 425, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also United States v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78, 79-82 (2d
Cir. 1988) (lawyer found to have misappropriated information of a client's capitalization plan),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1040 (1989); Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818, 822-23, 824-25 (3d
Cir. 1985) (Higginbotham, J., concurring) (directors of a corporation have a duty to disclose
information concerning a potential merger).
Chief Justice Burger first suggested the misappropriation theory in his dissent in Chiarella
Chief Justice Burger would have imposed lOb-5 liability on Mr. Chiarella, who "misappropri-
ated-stole to put it bluntly-valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him in the utmost
confidence." Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The majority in Chiarella
did not address the misappropriation theory because they did "not believe that a 'misappropri-
ation' theory was included in the jury instructions." Id at 237 n.21. in addition to Chief
Justice Burger's dissent, however, four other Justices, in three separate opinions, expressed
varying degrees of support for the misappropriation theory. See id. at 238 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring); id at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 245 (Blackmun and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
52. Eg., Newman, 664 F.2d at 17.
53. E.g., Elliott, 711 F. Supp. at 430-31; see also Musella, 578 F. Supp. at 438 (office
manager of law firm found liable for misappropriating information regarding targets of tender
offers).
54. Eg., Materia, 745 F.2d at 203; see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 239-45 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (misappropriation theory should apply to printer who acquires securities after ac-
quiring inside information on his job).
55. E.g., United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026, 1031-32 (2d Cir. 1986); see also
Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1266-71 (9th Cir. 1979) (newspaper reporter was re-
quired to disclose that he was writing favorably about a company whose stock he purchased
cheaply to increase the value of that stock).
56. See also United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (refusing to dismiss
charge that a psychiatrist misappropriated information from his patient); SEC v. Clark, 699 F.
Supp. 839, 843- 45 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (misappropriation theory applied to the president of a
company's subsidiary who purchased stock in the target of a takeover by the company); United
States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 699-703, 719-20 (S.D.N.Y.) (misappropriation theory may
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Corporate insiders and outsiders may have other affirmative disclosure du-
ties that also stem from fiduciary relationships. For example, the Supreme
Court has indicated that a fiduciary relationship may give rise to a duty to
disclose material, nonpublic information when the fiduciary knows that pur-
chasers or sellers of a corporation's securities are justifiably relying on him
for their investments," or when the fiduciary secretly is taking advantage of
the confidential information at the expense of the shareholders.5"
II. AN ISSUER'S DUTY UNDER RULE 10B-5 TO CORRECT AND TO
UPDATE ITS OWN STATEMENTS
A. Introduction
Those courts that have considered the issue generally have concluded that
rule lOb-5 requires issuers to correct statements that they later learn were
materially misleading at the time they were made.59 Several courts have
apply to the son of a corporate director), rev'd on other grounds, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985).
Cf United States v. Chestman, No. 89-1276, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 23242, at *61 (2d Cir.
Oct. 7, 1991) (en banc) (because a husband did not have a fiduciary or similar relationship with
his wife, and thus could not misappropriate confidential information from her, a broker who
learned of the confidential information from the husband was not liable under Rule lOb-5 for
trading while in possession of that information).
57. For example, in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), officers
of a bank acted as market makers in shares of a corporation that was formed by a group of
American Indians. Because the value of the shares of the corporation was difficult to measure,
the corporation asked the bank, its transfer agent, to stress to the Indian stockholders the
importance of not selling the stock. Id. at 146. The bank officers knew that the stock was
traded in two separate markets: a primary market of Indians selling to non-Indians and a
resale market consisting entirely of non-Indians. The stock was traded at a higher price in the
resale market than in the primary market. The Court found that the bank had assumed a duty
to act on behalf of the Indian shareholders and that those shareholders relied on the bank
when they sold their stock. Id. at 152-53. The Court held that this required the bank's officers
to disclose to the Indian shareholders the existence of the more favorable non-Indian market
prior to acting as market makers and inducing the Indians to sell their stock. Id.
58. For example, in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963), the
Court examined the fiduciary relationship that, by statute, investment advisers have with their
clients. The Court held that this relationship requires an adviser to disclose to his clients his
practice of purchasing securities for his own account shortly before recommending those se-
curities to his customers, and then selling his securities at a profit following the increase in the
market price resulting from the recommendation. Id. at 195-97.
59. See, e.g., Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1990); Ross v. A.H.
Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); Financial Industrial Fund v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,004, at 90,700-701 (D. Colo.
1971); see also Craftmatic Securities Litig. v. Kraftsow, 890 F.2d 628, 641 n.17 (3d Cir. 1989)
("[W]hen defendants voluntarily disclose information, they have a duty to disclose additional
material facts only to the extent that the volunteered disclosure was misleading as to a material
fact."); Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 26 (lst Cir. 1987) (misleading prior disclo-
sures can create a duty to correct); Rudolph v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 800 F.2d 1040, 1043
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been more reluctant to conclude that an issuer has a duty to update state-
ments that, while true when made, have become materially misleading,"
although other courts have readily accepted that issuers have such a duty.6 1
Commentators generally have accepted that rule lOb-5 imposes on issuers a
duty to correct, and on occasion have suggested issuers have a duty to up-
date as well.62 There have been few attempts, however, to explain the basis
for the imposition of these duties.
(11th Cir. 1986) ("Where a defendant's failure to speak would render the defendant's own
prior speech misleading or deceptive, a duty to disclose arises." (emphasis in original)), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987); Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 238 (6th Cir. 1985)
(rule lOb-5 prohibits omissions of material facts necessary to make other statements not mis-
leading), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986); First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307,
1317 (5th Cir. 1977) (defendant may have had a duty to disclose information that renders a
prior statement misleading), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978); Rose v. Arkansas Valley Env't
& Util. Auth., 562 F. Supp. 1180, 1207-08 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (defendant had a duty to disclose
when he learned that his earlier statement was misleading when made); Cochran v. Channing
Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) ("Fraud may be accomplished by... a failure to
correct a misleading impression left by statements already made."); cf In re Apple Computer
Securities Litig., 696 F. Supp. 490, 494-95 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (even if some of an issuer's state-
ments in an article were misleading, the same article included corrective disclosure, thus there
was no duty to correct those statements), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 886 F.2d 1109 (9th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3229 (1990).
60. See, e.g., Backman, 910 F.2d at 16-17; Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 758,
760 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985); Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunica-
tions Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1981); Shattuck Denn Mining Corp., 297 F. Supp.
470, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); see also Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 516
(7th Cir. 1989) (issuer not required to update projections in its periodic reports based on tenta-
tive internal estimates generated by its employees); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d
271, 291-93 (7th Cir. 1981) (issuer not required to update projections to reflect new tentative
estimates), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
61. See, e.g., Good v. Zenith Electronics Corp., 751 F. Supp. 1320, 1322 (N.D. Ill. 1990);
Wenzel v. Patrick Petroleum Co., 745 F. Supp. 211, 220 (D. Del. 1990); D & N Financial
Corp. v. RCM Partners Ltd. Partnership, 735 F. Supp. 1242, 1252 (D. Del. 1990); In re Gulf
Oil/Cities Service Tender Offer Litig., 725 F. Supp. 712, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Kirby v. Cul-
linet Software, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 1444, 1450-51, 1454-55 (D. Mass. 1989); In re Kulicke &
Soffa Indus., Inc. Securities Litig., 697 F. Supp. 183, 185, 189-91 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Kamerman
v. Steinberg, 123 F.R.D. 66, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Fry v. Trump, 681 F. Supp. 252, 258 (D.N.J.
1988); In re Warner Communications Securities Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff'd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986); Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 787-
88 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Thomas v. Duralite Co., 386 F. Supp. 698, 716 (D.N.J. 1974), modified,
524 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1975), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1209 (3d Cir. 1977); SEC v. Century Investment
Transfer Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 93,232, at 91,443
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
62. See, e.g., 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW
§ 9.27, at 9-137 to -138 (1990); GOELZER, SANGER, SUMMERGRAD & BERUEFFY, DISCLO-
SURE ISSUES, 19TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 9, 23 (1987); 5A A.
JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5 § 88.04[b], at 4-18 to -21 (1988); M.
STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES § 2.02, at 2-4 to -6
(1988); Bauman, Rule lOb-5 and the Corporation's Affirmative Duty to Disclose, 67 GEO. L.J.
935, 963-66 (1979); Block, Barton & Garfield, Affirmative Duty to Disclose Material Informa-
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Under the framework suggested by Chiarella and Dirks, rule lOb-5 should
impose on an issuer a duty to correct or update its own statements only if it
has a fiduciary relationship, presumably with its shareholders, that gives rise
to those duties. Thus, in determining whether rule lOb-5 imposes a duty to
correct or update, the central issues are whether an issuer has a fiduciary
relationship with its shareholders, whether that relationship gives rise to a
duty to correct or update, and what limitations rule lOb-5 imposes on the
scope of those duties.
By way of summary, the Chiarella and Dirks framework appears, on bal-
ance, to support the view of many courts that the privilege of raising money
by selling securities should result in concommitant duties on the part of issu-
ers to correct and update their own statements under appropriate circum-
stances. Most significant in this regard is that an issuer's relationship with
its shareholders should give rise to duties to correct and update to prevent
issuers from deceiving their shareholders into paying too much, or receiving
too little, for their securities. This could occur if an issuer, to maintain an
artificially high or low price for its securities, intentionally failed to correct
or update a statement it made after learning that statement was, or had be-
come, materially misleading.
tion Concerning Issuer's Financial Condition and Business Plans, 40 Bus. LAW. 1243, 1251
(1985); Brown, Corporate Secrecy, the Federal Securities Laws, and the Disclosure of Ongoing
Negotiations, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 93, 100 (1986); Gabaldon, The Disclosure of Preliminary
Merger Negotiations as an Imperfect Paradigm of Rule lob-5, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1218, 1248-
49 (1987); Goelzer, Disclosure of Preliminary Merger Negotiations-Truth or Consequences?,
46 MD. L. REV. 974, 977-78 (1987); Kariala, Federalism, Full Disclosure, and the National
Markets in the Interpretation of Federal Securities Law, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1473, 1530 n.238
(1986); Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98
HARV. L. REV. 747, 787 n. 168 (1985); Note, Rule lob-5 and the Corporation's Duty to Disclose
Merger Negotiations: A Proposal for a Safe Harbor from the Storm of Uncertainty, 55 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 731, 741-43 (1987); Comment, Duty to Correct, a Suggested Framework, 46 MD.
L. REV. 1250, 1253 (1987); Note, Corporate Officers'Duty to Speak Truthfully in Response to
Market Rumors: Levinson v. Basic, Inc. Holds Preliminary Merger Negotiations to be Material
Facts, 18 TOLEDO L. REV. 627, 634 (1987); cf Brudney, A Note on Materiality and Soft Infor-
mation Under the Federal Securities Laws, 75 VA. L. REV. 723, 749-50 n.72 (1989) (discussing
whether there is a duty to update); Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1340, 1366 (1966) (stating that "it would require no great extension of existing trends to read
[rule lOb-5] as providing a general sanction for an issuer's failure to disclose where previous
disclosures have become ... misleading"); Schneider, The Uncertain Duty to Update-Polar-
oid II Brings a Welcome Limitation, 4 INSIGHS, Oct. 1990, at 9 (supporting the en banc
Backman decision); Schneider, Duty to Update; Does a Snapshot Disclosure Require the Com-
mencement of a Motion Picture?, 3 INSIGHS Feb. 1989, at 3 (proposing the Commission adopt
a "safe harbor" rule allowing issuers not to update statements); Schneider, Update on the Duty
to Update: Did Polaroid Produce the Instant Movie After All?, 23 REV. SEC. AND COMMODI-
TiES REG. May 9, 1990, at 83 (proposing the Commission adopt a "safe harbor" rule allowing
issuers not to update statements).
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The Chiarella and Dirks framework does, however, reveal an important
limitation on an issuer's duty to update that often was not identified by
courts prior to the First Circuit's en banc decision in Backman v. Polaroid
Corp.63 An issuer should have a duty to update only "forward-looking"
statements-statements that by their terms purport to continue to be valid
beyond the date they were disseminated. An example of forward-looking
statements to which a duty to update should attach are financial projections,
which attempt to predict the issuer's financial condition in a future period. 
6
By contrast, ordinary financial statements, which report an issuer's current
or historical financial position, are an example of disclosures that are not
forward-looking, and to which a duty to update should not attach. A duty
to correct, on the other hand, should attach to both forward-looking and
non-forward-looking statements.
B. Applying the Chiarella and Dirks Framework to an Issuer's Duty to
Correct and Duty to Update
1. An Issuer's Fiduciary Relationship with its Shareholders
An issuer almost undoubtedly has a fiduciary or similar relationship with
its shareholders. 65 Among other things, the shareholders collectively own
63. Compare Backman, 910 F.2d at 17 ("We may agree that, in special circumstances, a
statement, correct at the time, may have a forward intent and connotation upon which parties
may be expected to rely. If this is a clear meaning, and there is a change, correction, more
exactly, further disclosure, may be called for.") with Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 758 ("[Ilf a corpo-
ration voluntarily makes a public statement that is correct when issued, it has a duty to update
that statement if it becomes materially misleading in light of subsequent events."). In Green-
field, however, the court noted that the defendant had argued that the statement that allegedly
became misleading was not subject to a duty to update because, by its terms, it "spoke" only as
of the day it was issued and thus literally could not be rendered misleading by subsequent
events. Id. at 759. The court did not reach that issue because it held that the statement never
became misleading in any event. Id. at 759-60.
64. See, e.g., Good, 751 F. Supp. at 1322; Kirby, 721 F. Supp. at 1450-51; In re Kulicke,
697 F. Supp. at 185, 189-91.
65. A number of courts and the Commission have suggested that an issuer must disclose
material, non-public information prior to purchasing its own securities, thus implying that an
issuer has a fiduciary or similar relationship with its shareholders that gives rise to such a duty.
See, e.g., Levinson v. Basic, Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 746 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds,
485 U.S. 224 (1988); Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 418 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 830 (1974); Green v. Hamilton International Corp., 437 F. Supp. 723, 728-29 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); In re Carnation Co., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 83,801, at
87,595 (July 8, 1985); Disclosure of the Impact of Possible Fuel Shortages on the Operation of
Issuers Subject to the Registration and Reporting Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, Se-
curities Act Release No. 5447, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,607,
at 83,629 (Dec. 20, 1973); SEC Comment on Timely Disclosure of Material Corporate Develop-
ments, Securities Act Release No. 5092, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
$ 77,915, at 80,035 (Oct. 15, 1970). Other courts also have indicated that an issuer has a
fiduciary or similar relationship with its shareholders for purposes of rule 10b-5. See, e.g.,
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the issuer. The issuer's officers, directors, and controlling shareholders,
through whom or at whose direction the issuer acts, have a fiduciary or simi-
lar relationship,66 and it is difficult to understand how these individuals
could acquire this relationship solely as a result of their affiliation with the
issuer if the issuer itself did not have such a relationship. Further, the fed-
eral securities laws imply a fiduciary duty on behalf of issuers, subjecting
them to, among other things, various registration and reporting require-
ments for the benefit of their public shareholders.67
Stated more formally, a fiduciary relationship is suggested by the consider-
ations expressly identified by the Reed court, and implicitly adopted by the
Supreme Court, for determining when such a relationship exists.68 An is-
suer's shareholders have reposed confidence in the issuer by virtue of having
risked their money to purchase an ownership interest in it. This confidence
results in superiority and influence on the part of the issuer, because the
issuer's shareholders effectively delegate the conduct of most of the issuer's
affairs to the issuer (operating, of course, under the direction of its officers
and directors, who are also fiduciaries of the shareholders).
2. Does an Issuer's Fiduciary Relationship with Its Shareholders Give
Rise to a Duty to Correct or a Duty to Update its Own
Statements?
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court has identified a number of
factors to assist in determining whether a given fiduciary relationship gives
rise to a particular affirmative disclosure duty.69 Taken together, these fac-
Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1203-04 (3d Cir. 1982); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 863 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319
F.2d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1963).
Several common law cases decided by federal courts have concluded that issuers have a
fiduciary relationship with their shareholders. See, e.g., Seymour v. National Biscuit Co., 107
F.2d 58, 63 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 665 (1940); Shewmake v. Badger Oil Corp.,
654 F. Supp. 1184, 1188 (D. Colo. 1987); see also Kohler v. Jacobs, 138 F.2d 440, 442-43 (5th
Cir. 1943) (corporations may not defraud shareholders while repurchasing their shares from
those shareholders). Other federal courts have taken the opposite view. See, e.g., Jordan v.
Global Natural Resources, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 59, 68 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Ericksen v. Winnebago
Industries, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 1190, 1193 (D. Minn. 1972); DuVall v. Moore, 276 F. Supp. 674,
680 (N.D. Iowa 1967). At least part of the reason for these different positions may be that,
according to some courts, the law of the state of incorporation determines the extent and
nature of a corporation's relationship with its shareholders. See, e.g., Glazer v. Glazer, 374
F.2d 390, 407 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967).
66. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
67. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1988).
68. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
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tors indicate that an issuer's relationship with its shareholders should give
rise to a duty to correct and a duty to update.
(a) The Language of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, and the
Legislative History of the Exchange Act and Section 10(b)
Even though neither the language of section 10(b) nor the language of rule
lOb-5 expressly imposes on issuers a duty to correct or update, these provi-
sions are broad enough to encompass such duties, just as they are broad
enough to prohibit insider trading without expressly doing so.70 An issuer's
failure to correct or update a misleading statement may, under appropriate
circumstances, constitute a "deceptive device or contrivance 71 within the
meaning of section 10(b). Most notably, an issuer, by intentionally allowing
the securities markets to continue to set the price of its securities based in
part on information that the issuer provided and that it now knows is, or has
become, materially misleading, may well deceive its shareholders into paying
too much, or receiving too little, for its securities.
72
In this regard, despite occasional statements that issuers generally have no
interest in their outstanding stock,7 3 there are a number of reasons why an
issuer might want to deceive its shareholders to maintain an artificially high
or artificially low price for its stock. For example, an issuer may want its
stock trading at an inflated price so that it or its insiders will receive a higher
price in an offering of its securities74 or in a third-party's tender offer for its
shares. 7- Having its shares trading at a higher price also may act as an effec-
70. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980); see also supra note 25
and accompanying text (discussing Chiarella).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
72. See, e.g., Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 946 (1980); see also Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904, 907 (S.D.N.Y.) (plaintiffs
alleged that the issuer, by breaching a duty to correct, presented a false and inflated picture of
its financial condition, which allowed its securities to trade at a higher price than if accurate
disclosure had been made), rev'd, 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946
(1980); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (harm caused by failure to
correct a statement that is, or has become, misleading is that investors are "induced to act in
reliance upon a representation which the representor knows has become false"); cf Basic, Inc.
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 228 (1988) ("Respondents alleged that they were injured by selling
[the issuer's] shares at prices artificially depressed by petitioners' misleading statements and in
reliance thereon.").
73. See, e.g., Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 377 (2d Cir. 1980); Etshokin v.
Texasgulf, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1212, 1216 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
74. See, e.g., Financial Industrial Fund v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., [1970-1971 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,004, at 90,699-700 (D. Colo. 1971).
75. See, e.g., Emhart Corp. v. USM Corp., 403 F. Supp. 660, 662 (D. Mass. 1975).
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tive deterrent to a hostile takeover bid. 6 Alternatively, the issuer may want
its stock trading at an artificially low price for purposes of, among other
things, a stock repurchase.""
For the same reason that it may be "deceptive" conduct for purposes of
section 10(b), an issuer's failure to correct or update its misleading state-
ments may constitute a "device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," in violation
of rule lOb-5(a), or an "act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person," in violation of rule
lOb-5(c).' 8 An issuer, by intentionally withholding corrected or updated in-
formation, may cause its shareholders to pay too much or receive too little
for its securities, if the price of those securities reflects information the issuer
provided, but now knows to be or to have become misleading. This may be
deemed to "defraud," or to "operate as a fraud" on, those shareholders.
An issuer's failure to correct or update its statements also might come
within the ambit of rule lOb-5(b), which prohibits omissions of "a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading."' 9 It is arguable,
though, that the use of the phrase "in the light of the circumstances under
which [the statements] were made," requires the statements that omitted the
material fact to have been misleading at the time they were made.8 ° If so, an
issuer might not be liable under rule lOb-5(b) for omitting corrected or up-
dated information.
76. See, e.g., Electronic Specialty Co. v. Int'l Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 941 (2d Cir.
1969).
77. See, e.g., Thomas v. Duralite Co., 386 F. Supp. 698, 708-712, 716 (D.N.J. 1974), aff'd
in part, vacated in part, 524 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1975), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1209 (3d Cir. 1977).
78. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a), (c) (1990).
79. Id. § 240.10b-5(b).
80. But see Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1981)
("In many instances, an omission to state a material fact relates back to an earlier statement,
and if it is reasonable to think that prior statement still stands, then the omission may also be
termed a misrepresentation."); Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 787
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (issuer's failure to update a press release that became misleading after it was
issued is within the ambit of rule lOb-5(b)); A. JACOBS, LMGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER
RULE 10n-5 § 88.04[b], at 4-20 (1988) (while clause lOb-5(b) "may have been intended to
prohibit half truths in the same document, it is literally broad enough to force a corporation to
correct its own prior statement"). In addition, other provisions of the federal securities laws
are worded to prohibit only statements that were misleading at the time they were made. For
example, Exchange Act section 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1990), prohibits in documents filed
under the Exchange Act statements that were materially false and misleading "at the time and
in light of the circumstances" under which they were made. The fact that section 18(a) is so
limited suggests that other antifraud provisions that do not contain a similar express limita-
tion, such as rule lOb-5, should not be read to imply such a limitation.
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Similarly, the legislative history of the Exchange Act and section 10(b)
suggests that section 10(b) is broad enough to support the imposition of du-
ties to correct and update misleading statements. Even though the Supreme
Court has observed that "the intended scope of § 10(b)... [is not] revealed
explicitly in the legislative history of the [Exchange] Act, which deals pri-
marily with other aspects of the legislation,"'" the Exchange Act's legislative
history at least implicitly demonstrates that one of the original purposes of
section 10(b) was to ensure accurate and prompt dissemination of material
corporate information to the investing public so that market forces could
determine the price of an issuer's securities based on that information.
8 2
This purpose presumably can encompass a requirement that an issuer cor-
rect or update its own statements when it knows those statements are or
have become misleading, and when it knows the market is continuing to rely
upon those misleading statements in determining the price of its securities.
(b) Common Law Fraud
Certain common law principles and cases provide significant support for
the imposition on an issuer of a duty to correct, and some support for the
imposition of a duty to update. At common law, a party to a business trans-
action generally owes to other parties to that transaction, prior to the con-
summation of the transaction, a duty to correct and update statements he
discovers are, or have become, materially misleading."3 This principle sup-
81. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202 (1976).
82. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 858-59 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934); S. REP. No.
47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1933); see also
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988) ("Recent empirical studies have tended to
confirm Congress' premise that the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets
reflects all publicly available information, and hence, any material misrepresentations."); Santa
Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977) ("the Court repeatedly has described the
'fundamental' purpose of the [Exchange] Act as implementing a 'philosophy of full disclo-
sure' "); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (federal securities
laws were intended "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat
emptor") (emphasis in original). It also is noteworthy that the preamble to the Securities Act
states that its purpose is "[tlo provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold
in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale
thereof, and for other purposes." Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74
(1933).
83. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(c) (1977); W. PiOSSER & R.
KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 106, at 738 (5th ed. 1984). As previously discussed, the
Chiarella Court quoted from section 551 with approval. See supra note 25.
Various federal and state cases have acknowledged that parties to business transactions have
a common law duty to correct or update statements that later are found to be untrue or mis-
leading. Eg., Robertson Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 871 F.2d 1368, 1373 (8th Cir.
1989) (applying Arkansas law); Everman Nat'l Bank v. United States, 756 F.2d 865, 869 (Fed.
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ports, but only partially, imposing on an issuer a duty to its shareholders to
correct or update materially misleading information. This support is quali-
fied because an issuer generally is not a party to a "business transaction"
with its shareholders. For the most part, once an issuer has sold its securi-
ties to the public, it is not a party to subsequent purchases or sales of those
securities.8 4 Frequently, an issuer strictly is not even a party to a business
transaction with its shareholders when it sells its securities to the public. In
a "firm commitment" public offering, for example, an issuer actually sells its
securities to an underwriter, and it is the underwriter who (perhaps through
additional intermediaries) sells those securities to the public. 5
Some common law courts have provided additional support for the impo-
sition on issuers of a duty to correct. These courts have expanded the com-
mon law principle discussed above and have imposed on certain types of
persons a duty to correct (but not a duty to update), even though those per-
sons are not engaged in a business transaction-i.e., are not in "privity"-
with defrauded purchasers or sellers of securities.8 6 Perhaps the premier
case in this regard is Fischer v. Kletz. 7  There, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York held that an independent au-
diting firm owes a duty to the investing public to correct its certification of
an issuer's financial statements when it learns that those statements were
Cir. 1985); McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458, 468 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 835 (1981); SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453, 461 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 920 (1969); Fitzgerald v. McFadden, 88 F.2d 639, 642-43 (2d Cir. 1937); Loewer v.
Harris, 57 F.2d 368, 373-74 (2d Cir. 1893); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 184-86
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Mammas v. Oro Valley Townhouses, Inc., 131 Ariz. 121, 123, 638 P.2d
1367, 1369 (Ct. App. 1981); St. Joseph Hosp. v. Corbetta Constr. Co., 21 111. App. 3d. 925,
953-54, 316 N.E.2d 51, 71-72 (1974); U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Black, 412 Mich. 99, 127,
313 N.W.2d 77, 89 (1981); Morykwas v. McKnight, 37 Mich. App. 304, 306, 194 N.W.2d 522,
524 (Ct. App. 1971); Bursey v. Clement, 118 N.H. 412, 414, 387 A.2d 346, 348 (1978); Ber-
geron v. DuPont, 116 N.H. 373, 374, 359 A.2d 627, 628-29 (1976); Susanoil, Inc. v. Continen-
tal Oil Co., 519 S.W.2d 230, 236 & n.6 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975).
84. An issuer engaged in repurchasing its shares from its shareholders would be a party to
a business transaction with its shareholders. In such a case, though, the issuer has an in-
dependent duty to disclose material, nonpublic information, including material, nonpublic in-
formation correcting or updating previous statements, to avoid insider trading liability. See
supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
85. For an explanation of an underwriter's role in firm commitment public offerings, see 1
L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 324-41 (3d ed. 1989).
86. This is consistent with rule lOb-5, under which plaintiffs need not prove privity; plain-
tiffs are not required to show that they sold their securities to, or purchased their securities
from, the defendant. See, e.g., Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339, 342-43 n.6
(9th Cir. 1972); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 805 n.12 (5th Cir. 1970); Iroquois Indus.,
Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963, 968 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 909
(1970); Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); A. JACOBS, LITI-
GATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 101-5 § 38.01[e][iv][H], at 2-114 (2d ed. 1990).
87. 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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materially misleading at the time of certification."8 The Fischer court held
that an auditing firm owes such a duty even though it is not in privity with
the investors:
The common law has long required that a person who has made a
representation must correct that representation if it becomes false
and if he knows people are relying on it. This duty to disclose is
imposed regardless of the interest of the defendant in the represen-
tation and subsequent nondisclosure.8 9
According to a subsequent case, this duty derives from the auditor's rela-
tionship with the investing public:
Where it gives an opinion or certifies statements, an auditing firm
publicly assumes a role that carries a special relationship of trust
vis-a-vis the public. The auditor in such a case holds itself out as
an independent professional source of assurance that the audited
company's financial presentations are accurate and reliable. The
importance of the act of certifying is such that a continuing duty to
disclose has been imposed where the auditor learns facts revealing
that a certification believed correct when issued was actually
unwarranted. 9
Many cases following Fischer have emphasized, however, that an auditing
firm's duty is limited to correcting its certification when it learns that the
certification was misleading at the time it was made. 91 An auditing firm
generally has no duty to update a certification that was accurate at the time
88. Id. at 184-89. The court also held that plaintiffs' allegation that the auditing firm
failed to correct its certification of the financial statements stated a claim under rule lOb-5. Id
at 189-94.
89. Id. at 188. Fischer is at odds with Judge Cardozo's well-known decision in UI-
tramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931), which held that an accounting
firm owed no duty to persons with whom it was not in privity.
90. Gold v. DCL Inc., 399 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (citing Fischer, 266 F.
Supp. at 180, other citations omitted).
91. See, e.g., Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F.2d 1040, 1042-45 (11th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987); lIT, An Int'l Inv. Trust, 619 F.2d 909, 927 (2d Cir.
1980); Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 761-62 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Natelli, 527
F.2d 311, 319 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976); Robin v. Doctors Officenters
Corp., 686 F. Supp. 199, 208 (N.D. Ill. 1988); In re American Int'l Inc. Sec. Litig., 606 F.
Supp. 600, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Reingold v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 599 F. Supp. 1241,
1257-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re North Am. Acceptance Corp. Sec. Cases, 513 F. Supp. 608,
635-36 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Ingenito v. Bermec Corp., 441 F. Supp. 525, 548-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 365 F. Supp. 780, 789 n. 10 (E.D. Pa. 1973), dismissed in
part and rev'd in part, 534 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir. 1976); In re Davy, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,482, at 86,559 (Jan. 25, 1984); see also Latigo Ventures v.
Laventhol & Horwath, 876 F.2d 1322, 1326-27 (7th Cir. 1989) (auditors are not under a con-
tinuing duty to disclose adverse financial information about a client; they may wait to report
this information in their next audit report); State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 113, 15
N.E.2d 416, 419 (1938) (auditor's " 'business is to ascertain and state the true financial posi-
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it was issued, but that subsequently became misleading.92 Instead, auditing
firms may wait to report such updated financial information in their next
audit reports.93
At least one reason for this distinction between an auditing firm's duty to
correct and its duty to update a certification is that the certification, by its
terms, is not forward-looking. As opposed to predicting what an issuer's
financial condition will be in the future, an auditor's certification states only
that the issuer's financial statements fairly reflect the financial condition at
the time of the issuance of those financial statements and the certification.
Specifically, the standard auditor's certification, or report, states that the au-
diting firm has audited the issuer's balance sheet and other financial state-
ments and that "[i]n our opinion, the financial statements referred to above
present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of [the issuer] as
of (at) December 31, 19XX, and the results of its operations and its cash
flows for the year then ended, in conformity with generally accepted ac-
counting principles." '94
tion of the company at the time of the audit, and his duty is confined to that' ") (quoting In re
London & Gen. Bank, 2 N.Y. Ch. 673, 682 (1895)).
92. There are instances in which an auditing firm must update certifications that were true
when made, but later were rendered misleading. For example, if an issuer is selling securities
to the public, its auditor must conduct a reasonable inquiry to discover whether events subse-
quent to the audit period require it to update the certified financial statements appearing in the
prospectuses. Kg., Ingenito, 441 F. Supp. at 549 (citing Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283
F. Supp. 643, 697-703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)); see also Rudolph, 800 F.2d at 1044-45 (accounting
firm had a duty to correct its certification of an issuer's financial statements, even though the
certification had become misleading only after it was issued, because the accounting firm knew
its certification was being used as part of a fraudulent scheme to raise money from investors).
Interestingly, the Fischer Court indicated that a distinction between certifications that ini-
tially were inaccurate and those that subsequently became inaccurate is unwarranted. Accord-
ing to the court, "the impact upon the person who relies on the representation is the same: he
is induced to act in reliance upon a representation which the representer knows has become
false." Fischer, 266 F. Supp. at 185.
93. Latigo Ventures, 876 F.2d at 1327.
94. Am. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, AICPA PROFESSIONAL STAN-
DARDS § 411.01 (1991). Generally accepted accounting principles also require an auditor's
certification to reflect certain material events occurring after the date of the financial state-
ments, but prior to the issuance of the certification. See id. §§ 530, 560.
Also, generally accepted accounting principles expressly require an auditor to correct a cer-
tification if he discovers it was materially false or misleading when issued. See id. § 561; cf
Robin v. Arthur Young & Co., No. 87 C 6222 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 1988) (1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14083) (citing section 561); Reingold v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 599 F. Supp. 1241,
1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The SEC has agreed. See, e.g., In re Schulzetenberg, Exchange Act
Release No. 26,103, 41 SEC Dkt. 1260, 1284 (Sept. 23, 1988); In re Jacobs, Exchange Act
Release No. 23,644, 36 SEC Dkt. 768, 769 (Sept. 24, 1986); In re Anderson, Securities Act
Release No. 6586, 33 SEC Dkt. 410, 411 (June 11, 1985); In re Davy, (1983-1984 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,482, at 86,559 (Jan. 25, 1984).
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The principle that an auditing firm generally has no duty to update its
certifications, while not supporting the imposition on issuers of a duty to
update their statements, also does not rule out imposing such a duty on issu-
ers in certain circumstances. Unlike an auditor's certification, an issuer's
statements do not necessarily report only existing or historical matters.
Rather, some statements, such as financial projections, may by their terms
purport to continue to be valid beyond the date the statements were made.
To the extent that an issuer's shareholders continue to rely on the validity of
such a forward-looking statement in determining the appropriate price to
purchase or sell the issuer's securities, the imposition on the issuer of a duty
to update that statement should not be inconsistent with Fischer and its
progeny.
This distinction between forward-looking statements by an issuer and cer-
tifications by an auditor underscores an important point about an issuer's
duty to update (but not its duty to correct): a duty to update attaches only
to statements that are forward-looking. Statements that by their terms do
not purport to have continuing validity are not subject to a duty to update.
95
More will be said on this point later.
(c) Commission Interpretations
Commission pronouncements concerning an issuer's duty to correct and
to update its misleading statements generally support the imposition of those
duties on issuers. In a few instances, the Commission has stated that issuers
have such duties.96 Also, on a number of occasions, the Commission has
Finally, policy considerations also support the distinction courts have drawn between an
auditor's duty to correct and an auditor's duty to update its certification. As one court
explained:
Relations of trust and confidence between accountant and client would be destroyed
if the accountant were duty-bound to make continuous public disclosure of all the
client's financial adversities. And the costs of auditing would skyrocket to compen-
sate the accounting profession for the enormous expansion in potential liability, not
to mention the increase in the costs of publication.
Latigo Ventures, 876 F.2d at 1327; see also Rudolph, 800 F.2d at 1044 ("It would be asking too
much to expect accountants to make difficult and time-consuming judgment calls about the
nature of routine facts and figures turned up after a report has been completed.").
95. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., SEC v. Mesa Ltd. Partnership, Litig. Release No. 12,637, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,492 (Sept. 27, 1990); In re Carnation Co., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) $ 83,801, at 87,595-96 n.6 (July 8, 1985); Integrated Disclosure: Proposed
Implementing Amendments to Rules, Forms and Schedules Under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934; Proposed Clarification of Safe Harbor Rules for Projections Under the Securities
Acts, Securities Act Release No. 6338, 23 SEC Dkt. 428-29 (Aug. 18, 1981); Safe Harbor Rule
for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 6084, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) T 82,117, at 81,938, 81,943 (June 25, 1979); see also In re Funeral Directors Manufac-
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"reminded" issuers of the importance of prompt and accurate disclosure of
material information.97 Nevertheless, the Commission has not accompanied
its support of the duties to correct and update with as extensive an analysis
as it employed in opinions such as In re Cady, Roberts & Co,9' the case in
which the Commission first concluded that insider trading violates rule lOb-
5,99 and upon which the Chiarella Court relied heavily in establishing the
existence and scope of insider trading liability." ° Accordingly, courts might
not rely as heavily on the Commission's interpretations regarding an issuer's
duties to correct and update as the Chiarella Court relied on the Commis-
sion's Cady, Roberts decision.10 Moreover, at least one Commissioner of
turing and Supply Co., 39 S.E.C. 33, 34 & n.3 (1959) (stop order proceedings under Securities
Act section 8(d) can be instituted only if the registration statement was materially misleading
when it became effective, but not if it was accurate when it became effective and subsequently
became misleading; the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act, however, apply to vendors
who omit to tell purchasers of the subsequent developments); In re Howard, 1 S.E.C. 6, 9-10
(1934) (same).
97. See, e.g., Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 6084, [1979
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,117, at 81,943 (June 25, 1979); Disclosure of
the Impact of the Wage and Price Standards for 1979 on the Operation of Issuers Subject to
the Registration and Reporting Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 6001, 16 SEC Dkt. 277 (Nov. 29, 1978); Notice of Adoption of an Amendment to
Rule 14a-9, etc., Securities Act Release No. 5699, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 80,461 (Apr. 23, 1976); Disclosure of the Impact of Possible Fuel Shortages on
the Operation of Issuers Subject to the Registration and Reporting Provisions of the Federal
Securities Laws, Securities Act Release No. 5447, [1973-74 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 79,607, at 83,629 (Dec. 20, 1973); Notice to Registrants Engaged in Defense and
Other Long Term Contracts and Programs of the Need for Prompt and Accurate Disclosure
of Material Information Concerning Such Activities, Securities Act Release No. 5263, (1972-
1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,852, at 81,865 (June 22, 1972); Timely
Disclosure of Material Corporate Developments, Securities Act Release No. 5092, [1970-1971
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,915, at 80,035 (Oct. 15, 1970); see also Ex-
change Act Release No. 10,365, 2 SEC Dkt. 346 (Aug. 27, 1973) (announcing settlement of an
action alleging in part that a company failed to disclose timely inaccuracies in projections
previously given to securities analysts).
Also, stock exchanges and the NASD typically impose on companies listed with them a
general duty to disclose promptly all material information. See, e.g., NEW YORK STOCK Ex-
CHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 202.05 [hereinafter COMPANY MANUAL]; AMERICAN
STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPANY GUIDE § 401(a), 402(a) [hereinafter AMEX GUIDE]; NASD
MANUAL, Schedule D, Part II § 1(c)(13). Accordingly, the exchanges and the NASD require
disclosure beyond that which rule lOb-5 requires. The exchanges, but not the NASD, often
allow companies to withhold material information for valid business purposes. See COMPANY
MANUAL, supra, § 202.01; AMEX GUIDE, supra, § 402(a).
98. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
99. Id at 911.
100. See supra note 25.
101. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-28 (1990) (discussing the Commis-
sion's decision in Cady, Roberts).
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the SEC (at the time he was a Commissioner) publicly has criticized the
imposition of a duty to update.102
(d) Longstanding Judicial Interpretations and Policy Considerations
The continued acceptance of the duties to correct and update also finds
some support from the near unanimity of courts in acknowledging an is-
suer's duty to correct, the substantial judicial recognition of an issuer's duty
to update, at least under appropriate circumstances, and the failure of Con-
gress and the Commission to reject the existence of those duties.1 °3 This is
102. See, e.g., Carnation Revisited: Toward an Optimal Merger Disclosure and Rumor Re-
sponse Policy, 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 521 (summary of then-Commissioner
Joseph A. Grundfest's address to the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, American
Bar Association) (available through the Commission); cf Merger Negotiations, Tender Offers
Taken Up by Panelists at "SEC Speaks" 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 345 (March
14, 1986) (reporting then-Commissioner Peters' view that the Carnation release "does not
amount to imposing an affirmative duty of disclosure").
In his Carnation Revisited speech, then-Commissioner Grundfest supported the concept of a
safe harbor from the duty to update. Adoption of such a safe harbor also recently was pro-
posed in Schneider, Duty to Update: Does a Snapshot Disclosure Require the Commencement
of a Motion Picture?, 3 INSIGHTs, Feb. 1989, at 3. See Schneider, Update on the Duty to
Update: Did Polaroid Produce the Instant Movie After All?, 23 REV. OF SEC. & COMMODITIES
REG., May 9, 1990, at 83. Citing to Mr. Schneider's earlier article, a drafting committee,
consisting of members of the subcommittees of the Committee on Federal Regulation of Secur-
ities of the American Bar Association's Section of Business Law, presented the Commission
with a proposed safe harbor rule. Letter from Richard E. Gutman to David S. Ruder, Chair-
man of the Securities and Exchange Commission (Apr. 28, 1989). Members of the Committee
on Securities Regulation of the Philadelphia Bar Association also wrote to the Commission
expressing that committee's support for Mr. Schneider's safe harbor proposal. Letter from
Donald S. Morton to David S. Ruder, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(May 1, 1989).
103. In addition, the continued imposition on issuers of duties to correct and update is
supported by the apparent willingness of courts to impose on some third parties a duty to
correct or update certain statements they make relating to an issuer. For example, independ-
ent auditors have a duty to correct their certification of an issuer's financial statements if the
certification was misleading at the time of issuance. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying
text. Other courts have concluded that a person conducting a tender offer for an issuer's secur-
ities may have a duty to correct or update his statements concerning the tender offer. See, e.g.,
Butler Aviation International, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 425 F.2d 842, 843 (2d
Cir. 1970); In re Gulf Oil/Cities Serv. Tender Offer Litig., 725 F. Supp. 712, 727 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); Kamerman v. Steinberg, 123 F.R.D. 66, 70-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Fry v. Trump, 681 F.
Supp. 252, 256, 258-59 (D.N.J. 1988); see also In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d
1236, 1243-46 (3d Cir. 1989) (tender offeror did not violate rule lOb-5 because he provided
updated information in a timely manner).
Other third parties also may have a duty to correct or update certain statements about an
issuer. See, e.g., First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1317 (5th Cir. 1977) (finan-
cial institution), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978); Financial Indus. Fund v. McDonnell Doug-
las Corp., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,004, at 90,699-700 (D.
Colo. 1971) (investment banker); see also Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064, 1066-
71 (7th Cir. 1975) (underwriter had a duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry of the issuer's
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true even though relatively few courts have purported to impose liability for
the breach of either duty,"o and few of the cases have attempted to provide
a detailed explanation of the bases of those duties.1 05
As frequently is the case with "policy considerations," arguments can be
constructed to support or attack the wisdom of imposing duties to correct or
update. In their support, the imposition of these duties on issuers will help
ensure that the securities markets promptly receive material information
that is necessary to prevent statements by issuers that are or have become
misleading from distorting the price of the issuers' securities. 1"c On the
other hand, the potential liability resulting from breaches of a duty to cor-
rect or update may cause issuers to forego making many voluntary state-
ments, thus depriving the securities market of a source of corporate
information." 7 Also, some courts have suggested that disclosure of facts
that are in a state of flux may be more misleading than silence.'08 Under this
financial statements), vacated, 425 U.S. 929 (1976), subsequent proceedings in 554 F.2d 790
(7th Cir. 1977), 619 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981).
Courts have been more reluctant to impose corrective or updating duties on other third
parties. See, e.g., Murphy v. McDonnell & Co., 553 F.2d 292, 295 (2d Cir. 1977) (stock ex-
changes); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Deloach, 708 F. Supp. 1371, 1378-85 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (financial guarantee surety to individual limited partners); National Union Fire Ins. Co.
v. Eaton, 701 F. Supp. 1031, 1034-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (same). This frequently has been the
case when the third party is a lawyer. See, e.g., Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104,
1124 (5th Cir. 1988); Moore v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 306 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 483
U.S. 1008 (1988); Bender v. Rocky Mountain Drilling Assoc., 648 F. Supp. 330, 335 (D.D.C.
1986); Bush v. Rewald, 619 F. Supp. 585, 590-95 (D. Haw. 1985). But see Morgan v. Pruden-
tial Group, 527 F. Supp. 957, 960-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 729 F.2d 1443 (2d Cir. 1983);
SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 712-13 (D.D.C. 1978). Further,
in the case of a lawyer, the imposition of a continuing duty to correct or update might impinge
on the attorney-client relationship. See, e.g., Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt,
797 F.2d 490, 497 (7th Cir. 1986).
104. See supra notes 59-61.
105. See id.
106. Cf In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, [1984-1985 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801, at 87,595 (July 8, 1985).
The importance of accurate and complete issuer disclosure to the integrity of the
securities markets cannot be overemphasized. To the extent that investors cannot
rely upon the accuracy and completeness of issuer statements, they will be less likely
to invest, thereby reducing the liquidity of the securities markets to the detriment of
investors and issuers alike.
Id.
107. See, e.g., Uncertainty Over Merger Disclosure is Costly, Grundfest Tells ABA Group, 18
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 521 (April 11, 1986); SEC Authority, Enforcement
Issues Head Topics at San Diego Conference, 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 154 (Jan.
31, 1986).
108. See, e.g., Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 711 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983); Staffin v.
Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1206 (3d. Cir. 1982); Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co.,
423 F.2d 1075, 1084-85 (5th Cir. 1970); cf Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988)
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line of reasoning, the requirement that an issuer involved in a tender offer, an
ongoing business negotiation, or any other "fluid" situation continuously
correct or update disclosures it has made might confuse shareholders more
than it enlightens them. Further, forced, premature disclosure might inter-
fere with, or possibly destroy, the successful completion of promising busi-
ness opportunities. 1  Accordingly, policy considerations do not appreciably
advance the argument that rule lOb-5 imposes a duty to correct and a duty
to update, nor do they appreciably detract from the argument.
3. The Scope of and Limitations on an Issuer's Duty to Correct and
Duty to Update its Own Statements
It is not enough simply to state that issuers have duties to correct and
update their statements; it also is necessary to consider the obligations that
are, and that are not, imposed by these duties. In this regard, one significant
limitation on an issuer's duty to update already has been highlighted: a duty
to update attaches only to forward-looking statements. As will be discussed,
this limitation analytically flows from the fact that a duty to update arises
only when subsequent facts or events render a prior statement misleading.
Further, three of the requirements necessary in any rule lOb-5 action-scien-
ter, materiality, and causation-impose other limitations on when an issuer's
conduct constitutes a breach of a duty to correct or update under rule lOb-
5.110
(too low a standard of materiality "might bring an overabundance of information within its
reach, and lead management 'simply to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial infor-
mation-a result that is hardly conducive to informed decision making' ") (quoting TSC In-
dus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976)).
109. See, e.g., Staffin, 672 F.2d at 1206.
110. See infra notes 113-27 and accompanying text.
The "reliance" and "in connection with" requirements do not impose any additional ele-
ments of proof in an action alleging a breach of a duty to correct or duty to update. As
previoulsy discussed, such cases involve omissions, as opposed to misrepresentations. In cases
involving omissions, the reliance requirement is satisfied by a showing of materiality. Affili-
ated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972); see also Basic, 485
U.S. at 243; Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1970).
The "in connection with" requirement is satisfied by showing reliance. See, e.g., Liberty
Nat'l Ins. Holding Co. v. Charter Co., 734 F.2d 545, 555 (1 1th Cir. 1984); List v. Fashion
Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). But see Chemical
Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 941-45 (2d Cir.) (misrepresentations by an
accounting firm about a company it audited, which induced banks to loan the company money
and take as collateral a pledge of stock of the company's parent, were too attenuated to be "in
connection with" the banks' purchase of the parent company's stock), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
884 (1984); A. JACOBS, supra note 86, § 38.01[b], at 2-43 (nexus between the fraud and the
purchase or sale that is required by the "in connection with" clause defines "'the type of
wrongdoing actionable under Rule 1Ob-5,' " and "should be distinguished from causation, reli-
ance and the test to determine what is misleading") (quoting City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom,
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(a) Limitation on the Duty to Update: the Duty Attaches Only to
Forward-Looking Statements
The limitation discussed earlier on an issuer's duty to update-that such a
duty attaches only to forward-looking statements-analytically follows from
the fact that a duty to update, by definition, arises only if a statement has
become materially "misleading" due to subsequent events."' A forward-
looking statement may become misleading as a result of subsequent events
because such a statement, by its terms, purports to remain valid beyond the
date it was made. Financial projections, for example, may become mislead-
ing if events occurring subsequent to the time they were disseminated signifi-
cantly alter the economic or other assumptions forming the basis for those
projections, or otherwise render those projections inaccurate. As the en
banc court in Backman stated:
We may agree that, in special circumstances, a statement, correct
at the time [it was made], may have a forward intent and connota-
tion upon which parties may be expected to rely. If this is a clear
meaning, and there is a change, correction, more exactly, further
disclosure, may be called for. 1
2
Subsequent events, however, should not cause a nonforward-looking state-
ment to become misleading, because such a statement, by its terms, relates
only to current or historical matters. For example, a press release announc-
ing an issuer's positive first quarter financial results, but making no mention
of the issuer's expected financial performance in the future, would not be-
come misleading as a result of a severe and unexpected economic downturn
in the second quarter. The issuer should not, therefore, have a duty to up-
date such a press release. The issuer might, however, have a duty to update
422 F.2d 221, 229 n.8 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970)). Some courts also have
suggested the "in connection with" requirement encompasses the "causation" requirement.
See, e.g., In re Financial Corp. of Am. Shareholder Litigation, 796 F.2d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir.
1986); Liberty Nat'l Ins. Holding Co., 734 F.2d at 555; First Virginia Bankshares v. Benson,
559 F.2d 1307, 1315 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978).
111. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
112. Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 17 (1st. Cir. 1990); see also Greenfield v.
Heublin, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 758-59 (1984) (defendant's "no corporate development" state-
ment may have spoken only as of the date of the statement); Kennedy v. Chomerics, Inc., 669
F. Supp. 1157, 1162 (D. Mass. 1987) (statement in a proxy statement spoke only as of the date
of the annual meeting, and therefore was not required to be updated later); Merger Negotia-
tions, Tender Offers Taken Up by Panelists at "SEC Speaks" 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 11, at 345 (March 14, 1986) (reporting that then-Commissioner Aulana Peters said that
"'You are always able to qualify your statement in some way to say "this is the situation as of
right now," '... indicating that a company could avoid triggering an updating requirement by
appropriately qualifying its statements").
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any financial projections it made in the first quarter if the downturn caused
those projections to become misleading.
(b) Limitations Arising from the Scienter Requirement
The requirement that, to violate rule lOb-5, an issuer must have acted
with scienter means that an issuer should be liable for breaching a duty to
correct or update only if the issuer intended, or recklessly disregarded the
possibility, that the misleading statement it failed to correct or update would
affect the price of its securities.' 13 In other words, to act with scienter while
breaching a duty to correct or to update, an issuer must have intended to
defraud," 4 or have recklessly disregarded the possibility of defrauding,'
purchasers and sellers of its securities when it breached that duty. As previ-
ously discussed, the aspect of an issuer's failure to correct or update mislead-
ing statements that could deceive or defraud its shareholders is the
possibility that the market will base the price of the issuer's securities in part
on the uncorrected or unupdated statement, causing the issuer's sharehold-
ers to pay or receive an unfair price for those securities. 1 ' In this regard,
the fact that an issuer gained, or was in a position to gain, from an artificial
increase or decrease in the price of its securities caused by its breach of a
duty to correct or update supports the argument that the issuer intended to
defraud purchasers or sellers of its securities through that breach.1 17 On the
other hand, an issuer who had nothing to gain from an increase or decrease
in the price of its securities caused by its breach of a duty to correct or
113. See, e.g., Thomas v. Duralite Co., 386 F. Supp. 698, 726 (D.N.J. 1974), aff'd in part
and vacated in part, 524 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1975), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1209 (3d Cir. 1977); Financial
Indus. Fund v. McDonnell Corp., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,004, at 90,700 (D. Colo. 1971); SEC v. Shattuck Den Mining Corp., 297 F. Supp. 470, 476
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (the term
"manipulative," as used in section 10(b), "connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to
deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities"); SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968) ("Rule lOb-5 is violated whenever
assertions are made, as here, in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the investing pub-
lic.., if such assertions are false or misleading or are so incomplete as to mislead .... ), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
114. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980); Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193-94
n.12.
115. See, e.g., Van Dyke v. Coburn Enter., 873 F.2d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. 1989); Hackbart
v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117 (10th Cir. 1982); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598
F.2d 1017, 1023-25 (6th Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court has reserved the issue as to whether
recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 686 n.5; Ernst & Ernst, 425
U.S. at 193 n.12.
116. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 497 (7th Cir.
1986); Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 680 F.2d 933, 942 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982).
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update is less likely to have had the requisite intent to support a rule lOb-5
violation. I Is
(c) Limitations Arising from the Materiality Requirement
In the context of an issuer's duty to correct or update, the materiality
requirement has a double-barreled application. First, it applies to the cor-
rected or updated information, and indicates that an issuer will be liable for
failing to disclose such corrected or updated information only if that infor-
mation was "material." This means that there must have been a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would have considered the cor-
rected or updated information important in deciding whether to purchase or
sell the issuer's securities.119 In other words, " 'there must be a substantial
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by
the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the "total mix" of in-
formation available.' ,120
Second, the materiality requirement applies to the misleading statement
itself. Thus, an issuer has a duty to correct or update a misleading statement
only as long as that statement still is material, that is, only so long as the
misleading statement continues, in substantial likelihood, to be important to
a reasonable shareholder in deciding whether to purchase or sell the issuer's
securities, or to be viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly
118. See, e.g., Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 711 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1983). Courts
have differed in the importance they attach to whether a defendant in a rule lOb-5 action
benefitted from its allegedly fraudulent conduct. Compare SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur.Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 858-62 (2d Cir. 1968) (corporation may be liable under rule lOb-5 for its mis-
leading statements, regardless of whether the corporation or its insiders profit from the mis-
leading statements), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) and Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180,
190-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (defendant need not gain from his fraud to be liable under rule lob-5)
with Financial Indus. Fund v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,004, at 90,700-01 (D. Colo. Jan. 28, 1971) (issuer and its underwriter
violated rule lOb-5 by failing to update overly optimistic financial information about the issuer
where there was an incentive not to disclose negative information about the issuer to assist in a
potential debt offering) and SEC v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp., 297 F. Supp. 470, 476
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (refusing to impose liability on a corporation for failing to update a statement
that had become misleading because there was no showing that the corporation derived any
benefit from the nondisclosure). Cf Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983) (fraudulent aspect
of insider trading is the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of" 'infor-
mation intended to be available for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of
anyone'") (quoting In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 936
(1968)); id. at 654 ("[A]n insider will be liable under Rule lOb-5 for inside trading only where
he fails to disclose material nonpublic information and thus makes 'secret profits.' ") (quoting
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C., 907, 916 n.31 (1961)).
119. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1978).
120. Basic, 485 U.S. at 231-32 (quoting TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449).
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altered the total mix of available information.' 21 Stated somewhat more col-
orfully, an issuer has a duty to correct or update a misleading statement only
while that statement still is "alive."'
122
In addition, the materiality requirement suggests that issuers may satisfy a
duty to correct or update in a variety of ways. An issuer's duty to correct or
update requires it to disclose sufficient information so that an earlier volun-
tary statement no longer is materially misleading. Of course, an issuer will
satisfy these duties by actually disclosing the information that rendered an
earlier statement materially misleading. 123 In some circumstances, however,
an issuer also may satisfy a duty to correct or update by disclosing only that
the prior statement is materially misleading, without disclosing the corrected
or updated information itself.
Consider, for example, an issuer that publicly and voluntarily has ex-
pressed interest in entering into an agreement with a retailing concern to sell
certain items it manufactures to the retailer for not less than $40 per item.
Assume the issuer later determines that it might be willing to consider a
lower price, say $38 per item. If this development gives rise to a duty to
update its "$40-per-item" statement, the issuer clearly can satisfy that duty
by publicly disclosing that it will now accept $38 per item. But the issuer
also might satisfy its duty to update by publicly disclosing that it may con-
sider a lower price per item, without disclosing its new minimum price.
(The issuer may have decided, for example, that not disclosing its minimum
price would assist it in obtaining the highest possible price for the items.) As
long as this updated statement informs purchasers and sellers of the issuer's
securities that they no longer should consider the issuer's initial "$40-per-
item" statement important in deciding whether to purchase or sell the is-
suer's securities, and as long as the issuer does not have an independent duty
121. If the materiality requirement applied only to the corrected or updated information,
but not to the misleading statement itself, issuers would have, in effect, a duty to disclose
material corrected or updated information solely because that information was material. That
would, of course, conflict with the Supreme Court's repeated admonishment that the posses-
sion of material information, by itself, does not give rise to an affirmative disclosure duty. See
supra note 24 and accompanying text; cf Basic, 485 U.S. at 238 ("[T]o prevail on a rule l0b-5
claim, a plaintiff must show that the statements were misleading as to a material fact. It is not
enough that a statement is false or incomplete, if the misrepresented fact is otherwise insignifi-
cant.") (emphasis in original).
122. Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y.) (citing A. JACOBS,
THE IMPACT OF RULE 10B-5 § 88.04[b], at 4-14 (rev. 1978)), rev'd, 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); see also Greenfield v. Heublein, 742 F.2d 750, 760-61
n.2 (3d Cir. 1984) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (rule lOb-5 prohibits misrepresentations and
omissions made "in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the investing public"), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir.
1968) (same), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
123. See, e.g., Basic, 485 U.S. at 230-32.
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to disclose its new $38 price (such as in a SEC disclosure form), the initial
statement should no longer be materially misleading, and the issuer should
have satisfied its duty to update.
(d) Limitations Arising from the Causation Requirement
An issuer will be liable for breaching a duty to correct or update informa-
tion only if that breach proximately and foreseeably caused an economic loss
to purchasers or sellers of its securities.124 This suggests that a plaintiff al-
leging a breach of such a duty must demonstrate that, as a foreseeable result
of the issuer's failure to update or correct a misleading statement, he
purchased the issuer's securities for more, or sold them for less, than he
would have had the issuer corrected or updated its statement.
The causation requirement also suggests several things about how an is-
suer should correct or update a misleading statement. To prevent a mislead-
ing statement from proximately and foreseeably causing shareholders an
economic loss even after a corrected or updated disclosure has been made,
the issuer should correct or update its disclosures in a way reasonably calcu-
lated to reach purchasers and sellers of their securities. Therefore, if possi-
ble, an issuer should disseminate the corrected or updated disclosure in the
same manner in which it disseminated the initial, and now misleading, dis-
closure. The issuer also should consider issuing a press release, notifying
any stock exchange on which its securities are listed, notifying financial pub-
lications and newswire services, and notifying interested financial organiza-
tions such as Moody's Investors Services and Standard & Poor's
Corporation.125 Further, to prevent a shareholder from purchasing or sell-
ing its securities at a time when the issuer knows of undisclosed material
corrected or updated information, and thus to prevent the issuer from poten-
tially becoming subject to rule l0b-5 liability, an issuer should promptly dis-
124. See, e.g., Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 801 F.2d 13, 20-
21 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1987); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629
F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); see also Currie v. Cayman Re-
sources Corp., 835 F.2d 780, 785 (1 th Cir. 1988) ("The plaintiff must prove not only that, had
he known the truth, he would not have acted, but in addition that the untruth was in some
reasonably direct, or proximate, way responsible for his loss.").
125. See, e.g., Prudent Real Estate Trust v. Johncamp Realty, Inc., 599 F.2d 1140, 1148
(2d Cir. 1979); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 736 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968); Powell v. American Bank & Trust Co., 640 F. Supp. 1568, 1579 (N.D. Ind. 1986);
COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 97, § 202.06; AMEX GUIDE, supra note 97, § 402(b); Brom-
berg, Disclosure Programs for Publicly Held Companies-A Practical Guide, 1970 DUKE L.J.
1139, 1161 (1970); see also Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 862 (rule lOb-5 is violated by a
misrepresentation made "in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the investing public,"
which suggests that any correction should similarly influence the investing public).
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seminate any required corrected or updated disclosures. 126 Whether an
issuer promptly has made a correcting or updating disclosure depends on the
facts of each case.
12 7
C. Special Considerations Concerning an Issuer's Duty to Update
Disclosures in Documents that SEC Rules Require it to Prepare
1. Background
In the absence of a statute or a Commission rule or regulation to the con-
trary, section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 should impose on issuers the same duties
to correct and update disclosures they make in documents that SEC rules
require them to prepare ("mandatory disclosures") as issuers would have
with respect to statements they make voluntarily, such as in press releases
("voluntary statements"). Nothing in the language of section 10(b), rule
lOb-5, or the legislative history of the Exchange Act or section 10(b) sug-
gests that the scope of the general antifraud provisions apply differently to
voluntary statements than they do to mandatory disclosures. On the con-
trary, section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 expressly prohibit "any" deceptive acts or
practices.128 Similarly, case law,'29 Commission interpretations,130 and pol-
icy considerations provide little basis for distinguishing between voluntary
126. See, e.g., In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1245-46 (3d Cir. 1989);
SEC Comment on Timely Disclosure of Material Corporate Developments, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 5092, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,915, at 80,036 (Oct.
15, 1970); see also Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 103 (10th Cir.) (defend-
ant's liability under rule lOb-5 ended when an investor reasonably should have become in-
formed of a corrective press release), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Good v. Zenith Elecs.,
751 F. Supp. 1320, 1322 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (an issuer may have been required to update a finan-
cial forecast made in a press release as soon as the updated information "solidified," and may
not have been entitled to wait until its next quarterly report to update the forecast); D & N
Fin. Corp. v. RCM Partners, Ltd., 735 F. Supp. 1242, 1252 (D. Del. 1990) (letter correcting
statements made in a proxy statement was timely).
127. Eg., Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d at 1246.
128. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990).
129. Courts frequently have imposed, or have been willing to impose, liability under rule
lOb-5 for materially misleading mandatory disclosures. See, e.g., SEC v. Falstaff Brewing
Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 75-77 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980); Ross v. A.H. Robins
Co., 607 F.2d 545, 551-56 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); SEC v. Benson,
657 F. Supp. 1122, 1131-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); see also Securities Act Rule 408, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.408 (1990) (requiring a registration statement to include, in addition to the information
expressly required, any other information necessary to make the required information not mis-
leading); Exchange Act Rule 121>-20, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (1990) (same with respect to
information expressly required to be included in a statement or report); cf Issen v. GSC
Enter., 538 F. Supp. 745, 751-52 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (issuer must provide all material information
in an annual report).
130. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 40:289
Materially Misleading Statements
statements and mandatory disclosures in the context of a duty to correct or
update. Indeed, the Ross decision, which was discussed in the introductory
portion of this Article,132 and which generally is viewed as one of the leading
cases on the duty to correct, involved an issuer's failure to correct
mandatory disclosures. Likewise, the Backman decisions, which also were
discussed in the introductory portion of this Article, 133 involved an issuer's
duty to update mandatory disclosures. Nonetheless, it may be helpful to
consider the extent of an issuer's duty to update disclosures it makes in cer-
tain types of documents it is required to prepare under SEC rules.
2 The Extent of an Issuer's Duty to Update Disclosures in Certain
Documents
(a) Periodic Reporting Documents
For the most part, an issuer should not have a duty to update many of the
mandatory disclosures it makes in periodic reporting documents such as An-
nual Reports on Form 10-K 134 and Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q.1
35
These documents generally require issuers to make disclosures concerning
previous fiscal periods and, with certain exceptions, do not call for forward-
looking disclosures.
136
In this vein, the Commission does not expressly require an issuer to up-
date information contained in its periodic reports until the issuer is required
to file its next quarterly or annual report, unless one of the six events requir-
ing an issuer to fie a Current Report on Form 8-K 1 37 occurs. These six
events are: a change in control of the issuer, the acquisition or disposition of
assets by the issuer or its majority owned subsidiaries, the entry of the issuer
into bankruptcy or receivership, a change in the issuer's certifying account-
ant, the resignation of one or more of the issuer's directors, and a change in
the issuer's fiscal year.'13  Conversely, Form 8-K does not expressly require,
although it does permit, an issuer to update other events that may affect
prior disclosures in periodic documents: Form 8-K provides that "[t]he [is-
suer] may, at its option, report.., any events, with respect to which infor-
132. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
134. 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1990).
135. Id. § 249.308a.
136. See generally SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, Form 10-K (1990) (previous fiscal year re-
port); SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, Form 10-Q (1987) (previous fiscal quarter report); see also
Form 10-K, General Instruction C(2) ("Except where information is required to be given for
the fiscal year or as of a specified date, it shall be given as of the latest practicable date.").
137. 17 C.F.R. § 249.308.
138. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, Form 8-K, Items 1-4, 6, 8 (1990).
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mation is not otherwise called for by this form, that the registrant deems of
importance to security holders."' 39
Certain mandatory disclosures in periodic documents, however, may be
forward-looking. Therefore, under appropriate circumstances, these disclo-
sures may be the subject of a duty to update. Most notably, the "Manage-
ment's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations" ("MD&A") sections of Form 10-K"4 and Form 1O-Q 14' re-
quire an issuer to: identify known trends, demands, commitments, events or
uncertainties affecting an issuer's liquidity and discuss proposed actions to
remedy any identified deficiencies;' 42 describe material commitments for
capital expenditures and anticipated sources of funding for those commit-
ments;' 43 describe known material trends in the issuer's capital resources
and indicate expected material changes in the mix and relative cost of those
resources; " and describe known trends or uncertainties that the issuer rea-
sonably expects will have a material favorable or unfavorable impact on net
sales, revenues, or income, and disclose any known events that will cause a
material change in the relationship between costs and revenues. 45 In addi-
tion, the Commission's instructions for preparing the MD&A section state
that "[t]he discussion and analysis shall focus specifically on material events
and uncertainties known to management that would cause reported financial
information not to be necessarily indicative of future operating results or of
future financial condition."'6
139. Id., Form 8-K, Item 5. In addition, unlike other information in a Form 8-K, which
must be reported within a specified time period, there is no mandatory time for filing a Form 8-
K reporting information pursuant to Item 5. Registrants simply are encouraged to fie such
forms "promptly." Id., Form 8-K, General Instruction 5.2; see also Securities Act Release No.
6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,387 (1982) ("Since reports pursuant to Item 5 are voluntary, the Com-
mission believes it is inconsistent to establish a specific time by which such reports must be
filed.").
140. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, Form 10-K, Item 7.
141. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, Form 10-Q, Item 2.
142. Regulation S-K, Item 303(a)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1) (1990).
143. Id., Item 303(a)(2)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(2)(i).
144. Id., Item 303(a)(2)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(2)(ii).
145. Id., Item 303(a)(3)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii).
146. Id., Item 303, Instruction 3 to paragraph 303(a), 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a).
These various requirements call for the disclosure of forward-looking information despite
the Commission's statement that issuers preparing an MD&A "are encouraged, but not re-
quired, to supply forward-looking information." Id., Instruction 7 to Paragraph 303(a); see
also id., Instruction 6 to paragraph 303(b). The Commission expressly noted in a recent inter-
pretive release concerning MD&A that "[s]everal specific provisions in Item 303 require dis-
closure of forward-looking information." Release No. 33-6835, 43 SEC Dkt. 1330, 1333 (May
18, 1989); see also E. FLEISCHMAN, ADDRESS TO THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL SOUTHERN SE-
CURITIES INSTITUTE, THE INTERSECTION OF BUSINESS NEEDS AND DISCLOSURE REQUIRE-
MENTS: MD&A, at 8-9, 17 (March 1, 1991) (edited and annotated) (noting that MD&A
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The potential need to update such statements was highlighted in the Back-
man cases. Those cases involved, in part, an issuer's alleged failure to up-
date a statement in a quarterly report to reflect that actual sales of a product
were below the initially optimistic sales expectations. Under the particular
facts of the case, however, the court eventually found that no duty to update
arose because the statement in the quarterly report never became
misleading. 147
(b) Transactional Documents
As compared to periodic reporting documents, "transactional documents"
frequently call for forward-looking information that, under appropriate cir-
cumstances, may be subject to a duty to update.148 In this context, the term
"transactional documents" refers to documents such as prospectuses,
through which issuers offer and sell their securities to the public; proxy state-
ments, through which issuers seek to obtain shareholders' authorizations, or
"proxies," to vote in a particular way on behalf of those shareholders at a
shareholder meeting; and tender offer documents.
Transactional documents generally contain a number of forward-looking
disclosures because their principal function is to advise shareholders (or po-
tential shareholders) of pertinent facts about a transaction or event that will
occur in the future. It also follows, however, that an issuer's duty to update
forward-looking statements in such a document usually should continue
only until the relevant transaction or event is consummated. 49 At that
disclosure is forward-looking and thus arguably subject to a duty to update under the en banc
decision in Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1990), but questioning
whether such a duty must be satisfied immediately).
147. Backman, 910 F.2d at 16-17.
148. See, e.g., Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 6084, [1979
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 82,117, at 81,938 (June 25, 1979).
With respect to forward-looking statements of material facts made in relation to spe-
cific transactions or events (such as proxy solicitations, tender offers, and purchases
and sales of securities), there is an obligation to correct such statements prior to
consummation of the transaction where they become false or misleading by reason of
subsequent events which render material assumptions underlying such statements
invalid.
Id at 81,943.
149. See, e.g., A.J. White & Co. v. SEC, 556 F.2d 619, 623 (1st Cir. 1977); SEC v. Manor
Nursing, 458 F.2d 1082, 1095-96 (2nd Cir. 1972); Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities
Act Release No. 6084, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,117, at 81,943
(June 25, 1979); see also Exchange Act Rule 13e-3(d)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(d)(3) (1990)
(requiring an issuer or its affiliate to file a final amendment to its Schedule 13E-3 no later than
ten days (or in some cases, ten business days) after the termination of the 13e-3 transaction);
Exchange Act Rule 13e-4(c)(3), 17 C.F.R. 240.13e-4(c)(3) (requiring an issuer or its affiliate to
file a final amendment to its schedule 13E-4 no later than ten business days after the termina-
tion of the 13e-4 transaction); Exchange Act Rule 14a-1(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1() (1990);
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point, the statements no longer will be forward-looking because they will
then relate to a transaction or event that already has occurred, and thus no
longer will be material, or "alive."' 5o
In addition to an issuer's duty under rule lOb-5 to update forward-looking
statements in a transactional document, other SEC rules and regulations
often expressly require an issuer to update all materially misleading disclo-
sures in transactional documents prior to the consummation of the relevant
transaction or event. For example, SEC rules require an issuer to update
documents it prepares in connection with a "going private" transaction,"' a
self-tender offer,"5 2 a proxy solicitation, 153 and a tender offer by a third
party.'54 In addition, Commission rules implicitly, although not expressly,
require an issuer selling securities to the public to update the information
contained in its prospectus during the course of the offering.'"
Exhange Act Rule 14a-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2 (defining the term "solicitation" and requiring
an issuer to comply with the proxy rules, and thus the rules requiring an issuer to update its
proxy statement and information statement, only during a "solicitation of a proxy"); cf RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2Xc) (1977) (stating that a "party to a business trans-
action is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to the other before the transaction
is consummated ... subsequently acquired information that he knows will make untrue or
misleading a previous representation that when made was true or believed to be so").
150. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
151. Eg., Exchange Act Rules 13e-3(dX2), (e)(2), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-3(d)(2), (e)(2).
152. Eg., Exchange Act Rules 13e-4(c)(2), (dX2), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4(c)(2), (d)(2).
153. E.g., Exchange Act Rule 14a-9(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a); see also Exchange Act
Rule 14c-6(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-6(a) (1990) (requiring issuers to update information
statements).
154. Eg., Exchange Act Rules 14d-3(b), -4(c), -6(d), -9(b), 14e-2(b), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-
3(b), -4(c), -6(d), -9(b), .14e-2(b) (1990); see also In re Revlon, Inc., 48 S.E.C. 496, 503-05
(1986) (rule 14d-9(b) requires the subject company to update promptly material information in
its Schedule 14D-9).
155. See Securities Act Rule 424(b)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 230.424(bX3) (1990). Courts also
have recognized the duty of an issuer to update its prospectus during the pendency of an
offering. See, e.g., A.J. White & Co. v. SEC, 556 F.2d 619, 623 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
969 (1977); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1095-96 (2d Cir. 1972).
Other SEC rules and regulations also impose updating requirements on issuers. See, e.g.,
Regulation S-K, Item 512(a)(1)(ii)-(iii), 17 C.F.R. § 229.512(a)(1)(ii)-(iii) (1990); Securities
Act Rule 144A(d)(4)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(4)(i) (1990); Securities Act Rule 503(d), 17
C.F.R. § 230.503(d) (1990).
Further, SEC rules and regulations require various third parties to make and update disclo-
sures about issuers. For example, officers, directors and significant shareholders must disclose
and update their transactions in an issuer's securities. See Exchange Act Sections 13(d), (g), 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), (g) (1990) (requiring reporting by 5% shareholders); Exchange Act Rule
13d-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1990) (same); Schedules 13D and 13G, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-
101 to -102 (1990) (same); Exchange Act Section 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1988) (requiring
reporting by officers, directors and 10% shareholders); Forms 3, 4, and 5, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 249.103 to .105 (1990) (same). The securities laws and SEC rules and regulations also
require a third party conducting a tender offer for an issuer's securities to update certain dis-
closures it is required to make. See, e.g., Exchange Act Sections 13(d)(2), (g)(2), 15 U.S.C.
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(c) Safe Harbor for Projections
Finally, the Commission has expressly provided a "safe harbor" sanction-
ing the voluntary inclusion, in certain periodic reports and transactional
documents, of specified projections and other forward-looking informa-
tion.156 The Commission, however, has expressly reminded issuers of their
duty to correct and to update this information."'
III. AN ISSUER'S DUTY UNDER RULE 10B-5 To CORRECT AND To
UPDATE STATEMENTS MADE BY A THIRD PARTY
Courts almost uniformly have concluded that an issuer does not have a
duty to correct misleading statements or omissions made about it by a third
party. 158 For example, an issuer generally has not been required to correct
third-party statements circulated about it in the press,' 59 by a financial ana-
lyst,"e° or by other members of the financial community.16 1 Although
§§ 78m(d)(2) (g)(2) (1988); Exchange Act Rules 13d-2(a), -2(b), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-2(a), -
2(b); Exchange Act Rules 14d-3(b), -6(d), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-3(b), -6(d).
156. Securities Act Rule 175, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1990); Exchange Act Rule 3b-6, 17
C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (1990).
157. Regulation S-K, Item 10(b)(3)(iii), 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(3)(iii) (1990); Safe Harbor
Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 6084, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 82,117, at 81,943 (June 25, 1979).
158. See, e.g., Osofsky v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 725 F.2d 1057, 1059 (2d Cir. 1984);
State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1981); Elkind v.
Ligget & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International
Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969); Etshokin v. Texasgulf, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1212,
1216 (N.D. I11. 1984); Zuckerman v. Harnischfeger Corp., 591 F. Supp. 112, 118-20 (S.D.N.Y.
1984); Weintraub v. Texasgulf, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1466, 1470 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Zucker v.
Sable, 426 F. Supp. 658, 662-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Hutto v. Texas Income Properties Corp., 416
F. Supp. 478, 482 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Milberg v. Western Pac. R.R., 51 F.R.D. 280, 282
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). But see Report of Investigation in the Matter of Sharon Steel Corporation as
it Relates to Prompt Corporate Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 18,271, [1981-1982
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,049, at 84,615 (Nov. 19, 1981) [hereinafter
"Sharon Steel Report"] (the Commission, in a report pursuant to Exchange Act section 2 1(a),
indicated that an issuer had a disclosure duty when rumors surfaced that it held a large block
of stock in the target of a potential takeover, when trading in the issuer's stock increased).
Also, stock exchanges often require immediate disclosure if rumors concerning material in-
formation develop. See COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 97, §§ 202.01, .03, .05; AMEX
GUIDE, supra note 97, §§ 401(c), 402(c); see also Elkind, 635 F.2d at 162-63 n.8 (stock ex-
change may impose a disclosure duty); Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. American Stock Exch.,
452 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1971) (same), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972).
159. See, e.g., Electronics Specialty Co., 409 F.2d at 949; Zucker, 426 F. Supp. at 662-63;
Milber& 51 F.R.D. at 282; cf Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365, 366-67 (2d Cir. 1981) (issuer
could be liable for misstatements and omissions made in its annual report when a shareholder
purchased securities after reading a favorable story about the issuer in the Wall Street Journal,
because the misstatements and omissions affected the "integrity of the market"), vacated, 459
U.S. 1027 (1982).
160. See, eg., Elkind, 635 F.2d at 163.
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courts generally have addressed these issues in a duty to correct context,
there is no reason to believe that the results would or should be any different
in a duty to update context. Courts have held, however, that an issuer does
have a duty to correct (and presumably a duty to update) a statement by a
third party, if the issuer was "sufficiently entangled" in the preparation of
the statement so that the statement can be attributed to it.
162
The principle reason why an issuer should not have a duty under rule
lOb-5 to correct or update a statement by a third party is that an issuer's
failure to correct or update such a statement is not "deceptive" conduct by
the issuer. No doubt, rumors or other information circulated by third par-
ties may well affect the price of an issuer's securities. The market, however,
should appropriately discount the effect of those statements on the price of
the issuer's securities to reflect that the source of those statements was not
the issuer.' 6 a The issuer's failure to reveal what it knows about the third
party statement, therefore, is not deceptive conduct by the issuer because it
fails to mislead either the market or purchasers or sellers of the issuer's se-
curities into treating the third party statement as though the issuer had indi-
cated its agreement with, or "vouched" for, the accuracy of the statement.
By contrast, an issuer that was so sufficiently entangled in the preparation of
a statement that the statement can be attributed to it may well be viewed by
the market, and by its shareholders, as having vouched for the accuracy of
that statement. In such a case, the issuer is not so much required to correct
or update a third party statement as it is required to correct or update a
statement it has accepted as its own.
Moreover, there is little in the legislative history of section 10(b), common
law fraud principles, or Commission interpretations of rule lOb-5 to support
imposing a duty on issuers to update or correct third party statements. 164
161. See, e.g., Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d at 850; Zuckermnan, 591 F. Supp. at 118-20; Wein-
traub, 564 F. Supp. at 1470.
162. Elkind, 635 F.2d at 163. See Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d at 850-51; In re General Motors
Class E Stock Buyout Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1119, 1129 (D. Del. 1988) ("A corporation may
also have a duty to correct or verify rumors in the marketplace directly attributable to the
company."); see also Panzirer, 663 F.2d at 366-67 (issuer could be liable for misleading state-
ments it makes that result in a favorable press report that causes shareholders to purchase the
issuer's securities); Swanson v. Wabash, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1308, 1321 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (target
company may have a duty to correct misstatements by the tender offeror "when the target
company's officers or directors act in concert with the offeror in a fraudulent scheme").
163. Cf Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988) (the market price of publicly
traded shares reflects all publicly available information).
164. In the Sharon Steel Report, the Commission did suggest that an issuer has a duty to
correct rumors. Sharon Steel Report, supra note 158, at 84,615, 84,618-19. The Commission,
however, did not bring suit to test this position, did not articulate a detailed justification in
support of the position, and has not frequently reasserted this position.
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The virtually unanimous judicial opposition to the imposition of such a duty,
combined with the apparent acquiescence by Congress (and, to a large ex-
tent, by the Commission) to that opposition also is support for refusing to
impose a duty on issuers to correct or update third-party statements.
In addition, there are significant policy arguments that support not impos-
ing these duties on issuers. Among the arguments are that the imposition of
a duty on issuers to correct or update third party statements could increase
issuers' costs by requiring them to monitor constantly all statements made
about them. These duties could well require issuers to make disclosures
that, in their business judgment, are better left undisclosed. These duties
also could allow competitors and others to compel issuers to disclose confi-
dential information by circulating unfounded rumors about the issuers.
There are, of course, policy arguments that support the imposition of these
duties. Most notably, the imposition of these duties would further the goal
of ensuring that the information investors receive is accurate. This benefit,
however, is heavily outweighed by the significant costs and burdens the im-
position of a duty to correct or update third party statements would entail.
Finally, even if issuers have such duties, there is some question as to
whether breaches of them would provide the requisite causation to support a
rule lOb-5 action. Specifically, for the same reasons that it is not deceptive
conduct, an issuer's failure to correct or update a materially misleading third
party statement may not constitute a proximate and foreseeable cause of an
economic loss sustained by a shareholder who purchased or sold the issuer's
securities based on the third party's statement. Such a case also might pose a
difficult scienter question, because the plaintiff would be required to identify
some fraudulent scheme or activity the issuer intended to further through its
failure to correct or update the third party's misstatement.
IV. CONCLUSION
An issuer's shareholders should be able to rely on the accuracy of state-
ments made by that issuer when determining whether to purchase or sell its
securities. An issuer, however, should not be required to review continu-
ously every disclosure it ever made to ensure that none of them have become
in any way inaccurate. Rule lOb-5 strikes a reasonable balance between
these competing concerns. It requires issuers to correct and to update their
statements when the failure to do so would defraud their shareholders. The
rule also recognizes that not every failure to correct or update a misleading
statement is fraudulent. Accordingly, allegations involving an issuer's
breach of a duty to correct or update cannot be resolved simply by reciting
that issuers have such duties. The more pertinent question, which inevitably
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must turn on the facts of each case, is whether that particular issuer had a
duty to correct or update the particular statement identified by the plaintiff.
